

Concrete Jungle: *the Foundation of the Modern Jamaican Polity*
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The modern Jamaican polity was founded in the dissolution of the British Empire following World War II giving rise to a two party system based upon personalism expressed in an intricate hierarchical system of patrons and clients.¹ Clientalism, the defining element in the socio-political development of modern Jamaica, produced an apparently liberal-democratic state combining both bourgeois parliamentary rule and colonial absolutism.² Gradual decolonization developed a political system with formal institutions that mirrored those of Britain but were subverted by the coercive and arbitrary elements of colonial absolutism producing a synthesis of liberal democracy and absolutism that fostered authoritarian democracy in Jamaica, based on a policy of suppression and co-optation of the black proletariat, whose quiescence is ensured by personalism and distribution of state largess.³

Jamaica's first prime minister, Sir Alexander Bustamante was sworn in on August 6, 1962 the culmination of a twenty five year struggle. His struggle, however, was not for independence, which was certain, but against his political opposition, the People's National Party and its leader Norman Washington Manley. This electoral victory followed the success of a JLP sponsored referendum withdrawing Jamaica from the West Indies Federation whose membership had been supported by Manley and the PNP, the collapse of the West Indies Federation was due to the inability of British Caribbean member states to consolidate their economic and political institutions and forge a regional identity, coincided with the final stages of British decolonization and Jamaica's first

¹Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 9.

²Carl Stone, *Democracy and Clientalism in Jamaica* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transactions, 1980), 108.

³*Ibid.*, 10-11.

independent elections in 1962.⁴ The result secured political hegemony for Bustamante and his Jamaican Labor Party which won twenty six of forty five seats in the legislature.

For the next decade (1962-1972) the conservative authoritarian JLP dominated Jamaican politics treating the state as an extension of the party which was itself an extension of Bustamante's labor union. Alexander Bustamante developed the first major Jamaican labor organization the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union in 1937. The BITU by 1944 controlled almost 90% of organized labor and firmly established trade unions as the dominant political force in pre-independence Jamaica. BITU domination of labor incited opposition from the leftist PNP. Labor being the means to political influence in Jamaica the PNP established the Trade Union Congress as an alternative to the BITU. The PNP previously existing as a solely political entity lacked proper understanding of organization of labor, the Trade Union Congress sought to broaden PNP support within organized labor. Coinciding with the creation of the TUC, the BITU founded the Jamaican Labor Party in an attempt to develop a political organization countering the PNP; thus formulating the two-party system upon which modern Jamaica is based.⁵ The authoritarian personalistic character of the Jamaican polity derives from its pre-independence party structures, subject to the will of party leaders. Thus, even as the JLP victory brought an end to 362 years of British hegemony, it ushered in a new era of political subjugation and manipulation of the Jamaican people by Jamaican leaders who

⁴ The West Indies Federation developed from the need to integrate the British West Indies holdings into a single economic and political entity that could be more easily managed. (Payne 1988, 150) The federation included Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago. (Euclid 2002, 95) The Federation was an attempt by the British Crown to maintain Caribbean holdings whilst preparing Jamaica for internal self-government. With possible sovereignty in reach the Jamaican people opted by referendum to withdrawal from federation and pursue independence alone. In June, 1962 the West Indies Federation would be formally dissolved. (Payne 1988, 154)

⁵(Munroe 1972, 37)

sought to maintain political hegemony by maintaining the status quo.⁶ The existing state of race class relations in Jamaica was a dual division of labor where the white ruling minority dominated industry and state, while the majority black/brown bourgeoisie established dominance in public bureaucracy.⁷ When developing labor, social, and intellectual movements challenged the Jamaican status quo the JLP suppressed dissent, intervening in the University, labor unions and urban slums, and so gained dominance of the worst ghettos in West Kingston.⁸

Table 3.1 The Changing Structure of Production⁹
Percent Contribution to GDP over the Period 1938-83

	Agriculture	Bauxite Mining	Manufacturing	Ownership of Dwellings	Government Services	Trade and Commerce	Other Services
1938	36	0	6	10	6	24	12
1950	31	0	11	6	6	15	12
1957	14	9	14	3	6	17	13
1968	10	10	15	n.a	9	13	16
1980	8	14	16	n.a	14	19	17
1983	7	4	19	n.a	15	20	21

Note: n.a. = not available

Sources: Abstract of Statistics, Department of Statistics, 1950-1968; Economic and Social Survey, Planning Agency, 1970-1983.

West Kingston slums had developed an urban sub-culture whose idiosyncrasies in speech, dress and religion reflected the hardships of the disenfranchised that negated if not rejected the Anglican upper class values of the political elite.¹⁰ The “Rude Boys” or “Rudies”, one of many emerging groups spawned by the ghetto sub-culture, altered speech, dress, comportment, courtship and salutation upturning social values as a form of

⁶Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 11.

⁷ Carl Stone, *Democracy and Clientalism in Jamaica* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transactions, 1980), 32.

⁸Mark Figueroa & Amanda Sives. Homogeneous Voting, Electoral Manipulation & the 'Garrison' Process in Post-Independence Jamaica, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 2002): 3.

⁹ Carl Stone, *Democracy and Clientalism in Jamaica* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transactions, 1980), 30.

¹⁰Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 73.

cultural resistance to the society that excluded them.¹¹ In a “celebration of instinctual needs” Rude Boys untucked their shirts, went without socks, substituted washrags for handkerchiefs as a sign of solidarity.¹² Proclaiming “Black Man time come” and “Is fi wi time now” Rudies “cultivat[ed]... fearsome violent personalities.”¹³ Yet, despite their cynicism, Rudies desired a better life, and by 1963 had begun to fight each other for control of the ghetto leading to the development of Jamaican “Turf Politics”.¹⁴ As infighting by Rudies incited a ghetto war in West Kingston, the JLP sought to manipulate gangs for party interest.¹⁵

During the summer of 1963 Esso Oil a subsidiary of the U.S. owned Standard Oil, began construction of a refinery on the West Kingston waterfront district of Kingston Pen used by fisherman.¹⁶ Residents of Kingston Pen, a squatter community displaced by dredging, had created a small union known as the Unemployed Workers Council. The UWC was founded in March 1962, by Saint Andrew cabinetmaker Ben Monroe.¹⁷ UWC doctrine stressed “a commitment to socialism, affirmation of the right to work, criticism of the drift towards suppression of liberties, opposition to external control of the economy, and resistance to the two-party practice of clientalism and victimization in employment.”¹⁸ UWC efforts focused on the creation of labor alternatives that sought to provide jobs on the basis of ability and not party affiliation. UWC opposed party related union rivalry, in support for development of worker self-management and union independence, UWC responsibility for the failure’s of organized labor was directed

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., 74.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Turf Politics is defined as the process by which political parties' seek geographic or positional control over given areas as part of electoral strategy. (Fuqueroa & Sives 2002, 6)

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville , TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 80..

¹⁷ Ibid., 67.

¹⁸ Ibid., 68.

towards both the BITU and NWU, and attempted to provide a force of opposition better adapted to the needs of all Jamaican workers'.¹⁹ The creation of a labor organization for unemployed is unique to post-war labor development in Jamaica. Initially ESSO had promised all jobs to Norman Manley's defeated PNP government to distribute among its National Workers Union faithful but, after its victory the JLP nullified previous labor agreements and distributed the jobs to its Bustamante Industrial Trade Union.²⁰ In response Micheal Manley²¹ made a deal with the UWC to stage a joint strike to end BITU labor union dominance by making Kingston Pen a national issue.²² But Manley double-crossed the UWC, whose existence had the potential to disrupt the informal power sharing of the two major parties and the labor unions. Manley brokered a deal with Bustamante exchanging Esso jobs for NWU members for its withdrawal from the strike. The understanding was clear employment for party loyalty.²³ When UWC members arrived to strike they were met by 200 riot police who commenced to subdue the U.W.C. with tear gas and baton.²⁴ Five months later the Bustamante government ordered the UWC squatters evicted and seized the land for state housing. Those evicted were allowed to file a "letter of intent" for possible housing.²⁵ U.W.C. ignored the notice and maintained their residency in Kingston Pen. On the day of deadline bulldozers and riot police met demonstrators, residents armed with stones, and mothers with children

¹⁹ Ibid., 69.

²⁰ Ibid., 80.

²¹ Michael Norman Manley was born in Kingston, Jamaica in 1924. Son of P.N.P. leader and Jamaican Premier 1959-1962 Norman Washington Manley. Michael Manley became a trade unionist in the N.W.U. in 1952 following a leftist purge. 1962 Michael Manley was appointed to a senatorial position in the upper Jamaican legislature and won election to the House of Representative in 1967. In 1969 with the illness of his father, Manley assumed leadership of the P.N.P. Michael Manley became the fourth Prime Minister of Jamaica in 1972. (Levi 1990, 1-3)

²² Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 80.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., 81.

attempting to halt bulldozers.²⁶ Police responded with brutality. Public outrage with J.L.P. treatment of squatters temporarily postponed eviction and the JLP undertook a public relations campaign that portrayed the squatters as good hardworking Jamaicans, but no worse off than anyone else. Minister of Housing published a statement in the *Daily Gleaner* clarifying its position on Kingston Pen squatters.

“Some people living in Kingston Pen are known to be steadily employed and others obtain temporary employment from time to time, and are in no worse position than many other of our citizens, but they have chosen to live in this slum for various reasons which are best known to them. In these circumstances, Government can see no justification for providing alternative accommodation which would be costly and would divert funds which are desperately needed to provide additional housing.”²⁷

The JLP exerted dominance over inhabitants of Kingston Pen, by portraying them as patriotic, hard-working, citizens while simultaneously depriving them of rights and liberties. The tactics employed at Kingston Pen emerged and would become known as Jamaican Exceptionalism that transformed slums into the most influential and violent political entity in Jamaica.²⁸ Jamaican Exceptionalism was an ideological position developed to restrain proletarian animus for increasingly evident class inequalities to create a socio-political environment inviting of foreign capital.²⁹ Exceptionalism is the conflict between the pluralist society and the subversive authoritarian state. The British Governor Sir Kenneth Blackburn noted that

“in a world which is at present sadly disturbed by ideological and racial differences, Jamaica has established a reputation second to none for tolerance, harmony between peoples of all kinds, and so for happiness and progress.”³⁰

After 1963, Kingston slums rapidly deteriorated into an urban jungle of poverty, gang warfare, illegal activity, and a highly politicized labor market. Further J.L.P. intrusion into West Kingston only antagonized resident disdain for state policies and

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 80.

²⁸Ibid., 82.

²⁹Ibid., 54.

³⁰*Daily Gleaner*, 27 Oct. 1960.

institutions furthering the development of a resistance sub-culture in Urban Jamaica. For the disenfranchised illegal activities became acts of opposition.³¹ JLP attempts to monopolize West Kingston led to increased violence and voter manipulation in the latter half of the 1960's. Eviction was the means to force squatters from their homes in order to construct public housing complexes that could be occupied by party loyal. The use of public housing as a means of political patronage established garrisons as a dominant force in Jamaican politics. Garrisons are “a veritable fortress where the dominant party and or its local agents and supporters are able to exercise control over all significant political, economic and community related social activities.”³² Garrisons' such as Tivoli Gardens, Jungle, Payne Land and Rema allowed the JLP to establish entire communities of party loyal dependent upon the JLP for basic necessities of survival.³³ The JLP attempted to ensure its political hegemony through development of constituencies wholly dependent upon the party disbursement of housing, employment, and public works. Housing residents were devoted entirely to the JLP. Little variance of political opinion was tolerated within government housing garrisons where residence depended on hard-core support for the part but in the neighborhood outside divergent political opinion flourished. The lack of diverse political opinion within garrisons' fostered an ideological climate of fanaticalism that explains why garrison residents were willing to sacrifice much for the party in exchange for little. When BITU women gathered around Bustamante they sang:

We will follow Bustamante

³¹Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville , TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 54.

³²Carl Stone, *Democracy and Clientalism in Jamaica* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1980)

³³Mark Figueroa & Amanda Sives. Homogeneous Voting, Electoral Manipulation & the 'Garrison' Process in Post-Independence Jamaica, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 2002): 6.

We will follow Bustamante
Till we die
Bustamante is a good man
Bustamante never did wrong
We will follow Bustamante
Till we die³⁴

Prior to the construction of the first government housing project Tivoli Gardens, no member of parliament had been re-elected to a second term.³⁵ JLP establishment of government housing for loyal supporters spurned thousands of West Kingston residents unable to receive state support. The PNP capitalized upon JLP displacement and harassment of ghetto dwellers to organize opposition and establish a counter force within slums. By 1966 the fight for political dominance within ghetto's reached a climax. PNP attempts to create a support base in West Kingston intensified relations between the disenfranchised and JLP government inciting further illiberal JLP actions, forcing residents to choose sides; transforming West Kingston into a battle ground for political supremacy.³⁶ Dependency upon gangs for the encroachment or consolidation of electoral gains was integrated into the electoral process, thereby legitimizing the role of violent gangs.³⁷ The party that established electoral domination of West Kingston assumed precedence over the entire political realm.

The growing political influence of garrisons' afforded ghetto housing projects greater levels of autonomy and diminished state interference. Maintenance of J.L.P dominance in Urban Kingston forced the government to allow certain levels of extraterritoriality as another means of political favor. Both government and law

³⁴ Carlene J. Edie. "Jamaican Political Processes: a System in search of a Paradigm" *Journal of Development Studies* Vol. 20 issue 4 (1984) : 253.

³⁵ Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville , TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 119.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 119.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 120.

enforcement virtually withdrew from politically loyal neighborhoods and turned governance over to local gang leaders. The lack of law enforcement inside ghettos led to rapid deterioration of order, increased violence, and growing autonomy amongst Rude Boys. The J.L.P responded with the ratification of a number of laws meant to undermine developing gang superiority in West Kingston. The Emergency Powers Act of 1966 was the latest in a series of J.L.P legislation designed to give the state *carte blanche* in undermining dissent and divergence of party interest.³⁸ The process by which the JLP awarded loyal garrisons' access to state largess and varying levels of autonomy awarded politically appointed gangs increased political and economic power that fostered state defiance, insighting JLP authoritarian action for the reinstatement of dominance, developed a feudal system within West Kingston. The Emergency Powers Acts allowed the declaration of a state of emergency and the imposition of marshal law, which provided a means for JLP reassertion of dominance inside Kingston; later the EPA would be used as a legal basis for subjugation of liberal academia, harassment of anti-status quo groups and movements, seizure of passports, entrance denial to foreign travelers, and disbursement of "subversive literature."³⁹

JLP authoritarian rule and consolidation of power continued unabated after electoral victory in 1967. The JLP received 51% of the vote keeping the party's parliamentary majority with 33 of 53 seats.⁴⁰ Sir Donald Sangster defeated Norman Manley to become the second Prime Minister of Jamaica maintaining JLP political

³⁸ Prior to the implementation of the Emergency Powers Act of 1966 the government relied on a 1963 flogging law requiring mandatory flogging, sentencing, and manual labor for serious crimes in order to control urban unrest. The law was revised in 1965 allowing the use of "cat-o-nine-tails" and tamarind switch in prisons. (Gray 1991, 122)

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Euclid A. Rose, *Dependency and Socialism in the Modern Caribbean: Super Power Intervention in Guyana, Jamaica, and Grenada, 1970-1985*. (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002), 234.

supremacy.⁴¹ Sangster died two months after the election and was replaced by Hugh Shearer, Island Supervisor of the BITU and Bustamante's protégé.⁴² After the 1967 elections the JLP adapted its subversive policies for the disruption of mounting opposition from the University of the West Indies.⁴³ JLP frustration with UWI stemmed from the development of Black Nationalist sentiment among the educated, which previously had only existed within the lower class. UWI Guyanese Professor Walter Rodney became the central target of JLP efforts to subordinate the University.⁴⁴

Walter Rodney advocated the study of African history to better understand the identity of Jamaica, which was the product of its African heritage. Rodney brought together “two currents of post-colonial protest, socialism and cultural nationalism”, which became the foundation for later PNP attempts to identify with the disenfranchised.⁴⁵ Rodney's teachings transcended boundaries that had previously prevented the alliance between poor and intellectuals. For Rodney the Jamaican struggle was only one aspect of a greater global conflict between white imperialist powers and the “poor black underdeveloped world”.⁴⁶ Rodney stressed that the “association of wealth with whites, and poverty with blacks is not accidental. It is the nature of the imperialist relationship that enriched the metropolis at the expense of the colony, i.e., it makes the whites richer and the blacks’ poorer.” The simplicity of Rodney's message is the cause of

⁴¹Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 108.

⁴²Evelyn H. Stephens & John D. Stephens, *Democratic Socialism in Jamaica: the Political Movement and Social Transformation in Dependent Capitalism*. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 48.

⁴³ University College of the West Indies was founded in 1946 to provide higher education for the British West Indies. Unlike the West Indies Federation the U.W.I. succeeded in development of a pan-Caribbean identity. (Gray 1991, 125)

⁴⁴Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 121.

⁴⁵Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 156.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 154.

the popularity he received from all segments of society.⁴⁷ In August of 1968 the JLP requested that the Vice-Chancellor terminate Rodney; the Chancellor refused only to be asked again two months later.⁴⁸ The Chancellor defended Rodney and cited that no illegal act had been committed.⁴⁹ JLP animus towards the University was the result of UWI's failure to actively support the JLP administration.⁵⁰

Alexander Bustamante defended the JLP assertion that UWI criticism was the product of dissenting foreign professors, arguing that “an alien who has the audacity and impertinence not just to criticize but to write offensively against the Government or any of the ministers will be considered a persona non grata and will be ordered out.”, adding that “those who cannot be deported because they are Jamaican citizens can be dealt with.”⁵¹ On October 15, 1968 Walter Rodney returned to Jamaica from a conference of black writers in Canada, upon arrival the professor was informed that he would not be permitted re-entry.⁵² JLP actions against Rodney were validated through the Foreign Nationals and Commonwealth Citizens Employment Act of 1964 for the protection of Jamaican jobs.⁵³ The students and faculty responded the following day with a non-violent protest that fomented proletarian uprising throughout Kingston.

Students and Faculty gathered at UWI the day following Rodney's expulsion for a planned march on the offices of the Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs.⁵⁴

⁴⁷Walter Rodney, *the Groundings with My Brothers*. (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, 1969.) 16-23.

⁴⁸Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville , TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 154.

⁴⁹Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 121.

⁵⁰Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville , TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 130.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 131.

⁵²Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 121.

⁵³Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville , TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 256.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 158.

Pamphlets on non-violent protest were disseminated amongst students prior to the march. The JLP ordered riot police armed with tear gas, pistols, and machine gun be placed on the Mona Road between UWI and Kingston.⁵⁵ Due to the peaceful disposition of students police did not intervene in the march as it progressed towards Kingston.⁵⁶ As the students neared their destination they were joined by members of the lumpen proletariat and unemployed. Upon arrival to the Ministry of Home Affairs students were informed that the Minister would be unable to hold an audience, the protesters continued onward towards the office of the Prime Minister. The students were again denied an audience, with the assurance that PM Shearer would be available in two days time.⁵⁷ The deliberate JLP affront, forced students and faculty to continue onward and regroup at George VI Park.⁵⁸ When the University protesters began to disburse they were attacked with stones thrown from nearby JLP offices that instigated a violent reaction from non-University protesters within the group.⁵⁹ The unemployed and proletariat began to attack JLP headquarters as University faculty tried in vain to maintain peace. Retreating students were confronted by riot police who commenced to subdue the marchers with baton and teargas. Students were caught between police and the militant poor who were burning houses, overturning automobiles, looting and destroying government buildings.⁶⁰ By days end 90 buildings had been damaged, 100 buses destroyed, 100 million pounds sterling in property damage and three lower class protesters shot dead.⁶¹

The “Rodney Riots” of 1968 exposed the JLP's failure to provide a cohesive

⁵⁵Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 256.

⁵⁶Ibid., 158.

⁵⁷Ibid., 159.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid., 160.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 121.

government that bound together the various groups within Jamaican society. Whereas clientalism provided a means for JLP subversion of the disenfranchised, the University, an institution of the ruling class, lacked the need for capital that would allow for JLP cooption. The JLP responded to the Rodney Riots with further authoritarian actions meant to break University independence and establish JLP control over the institution.⁶² The JLP newspaper *The Daily Gleaner* began to actively campaign against the students and University. “The Country had better learn quickly that it will be disastrous to practice a policy of fatal conceit by thinking it can keep open bosom to international serpents. If Jamaican students knew the facts... they would not only be ashamed of themselves, but also would be gravely alarmed.”⁶³ The *Gleaner* alleged that UWI students were “inflamed by fanatics and... corrupt agitators... when next they march illegally they will not have the excuse of first time folly.”⁶⁴ The *Gleaner* alleged that

“It seems to be a common belief in the West Indies that to be an intellectual is to sit around and smoke pot and to hold views of extreme left politics, and to plot to overthrow any system of government... in the interest of 'changing society'.”⁶⁵

After the Rodney Riots of 1968 the JLP appointed Barbadian law professor Roy O. Marshall to replace Philip Sherlock as vice-chancellor of UWI.⁶⁶ The JLP forced Marshall to approve a “Code of Conduct” to curb political activity at UWI as well as the imposition of security checks for all newly appointed staff.⁶⁷ The Code of Conduct was designed for the assertion of JLP attitudes towards UWI in matters of “staff-student relations, extra-university activity and participation in politics.”⁶⁸ The JLP through the

⁶²Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 160.

⁶³Ibid., 162.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Editorial: “Communist Subversion, the University and Jamaica,” *Sunday Gleaner*, 3 Nov. 1968.

⁶⁶Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 190.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Ibid.

Code of Conduct sought to prevent the manipulation of students and University organizations by radical professors. JLP measures to subdue political activism at UWI went beyond the implementation of a Code of Conduct with the University declaration that professors' must exhibit in non-university activities "the same attributes that mark the discharge of... university functions, namely: objectivity, impartiality in assessing evidence, logical reasoning and integrity."⁶⁹ Norman Manley responded to JLP assertions that student actions in 1968 jeopardized national security by providing a catalyst for an island wide black uprising, commenting that "no matter how serious the local situation appeared, the U.S. would never tolerate a hostile revolution in its sphere of influence."⁷⁰

The Rodney Riots provided a basis for increased JLP authoritarian measures to subdue dissents. Increased JLP intervention into the University and subjugation of civil liberties produced opposition from previously supportive groups such as the Bar Council, the West Indies Group of University Teachers, and Jamaica Teachers Association.⁷¹ As a result of JLP illiberal actions after 1968 the party lost confidence among major interest groups that began to fear JLP interference beyond the urban and academic sectors, and further erosion of the democratic process.⁷² Two of the five motions passed at the 1968 JLP conference were votes of confidence in PM Shearer. The events after the Rodney Riots ended JLP political dominance as private industry, academia and the urban disenfranchised began to shift their support to the People's National Party.

The decade of JLP rule (1962-1972) is characterized by the parties attempt to establish dominance over the whole of Jamaican society that coincided with the efforts to advance the Jamaican economy. The JLP inherited an economy transitioning from

⁶⁹*Daily Gleaner*, 6 Sept. 1969.

⁷⁰ Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 163.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 164

⁷²*Ibid.*

agriculturally based production to a service sector dominated economy reliant upon the exportation of bauxite/alumina for generation of capital. Since 1938 agriculture declined from 36% of the GDP to 10% by 1968.⁷³ The diminished importance of agricultural production coincided with a 22% decline in acreage of arable land.⁷⁴ By 1962 bauxite/alumina accounted for 48.6% of all exports and a service sector that comprised 52% of the GDP.⁷⁵ The JLP implemented the Five Year Independence Plan (1962-1968) that called for 129% increase in development and community services, 97% growth in economic services, and JLP assertion of social and economic incentives.⁷⁶ The JLP Five Year Plan disavowed government intervention into production stressing the policy of “equality of opportunity under capitalism” that defines the JLP non-interventionist stance into the Jamaican economy.⁷⁷

JLP economic policies failed to provide sustainable economic development throughout its ten year rule. The concentration upon development of the public sector allowed the JLP to provide jobs, although limited in number, that could be used both for the development of public works, and as a means of patronage to party faithful. By 1968 the JLP had quadrupled the number of public sector employees to 57,000, public sector jobs would increase to 110,000 jobs by 1980.⁷⁸ The government concentration on the development of public services was unable to alleviate the greater problems of the Jamaican economy.

Poor income distribution is one of the largest economic problems in post-war Jamaica, resulting from the economies reliance on foreign capital. 19% of corporations

⁷³ Abstract of Statistics, Department of Statistics, 1950-1968.

⁷⁴ Omar Davies & Michael Witter, *The development of the Jamaican Economy since independence* (Kingston, Jamaica: Heinemann Publishers (Caribbean)Limited, 1989), 84.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 80.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 87.

⁷⁷ Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville , TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 101.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 36.

receive 91% of gross incomes, with 11% of private tax payers receiving 47% of gross incomes.⁷⁹ Jamaican's also "consumed what they didn't produce, and produced what they didn't consume."⁸⁰ Emigration had been a means to alleviate rising unemployment, within the first twenty-five years of independence 485,000 Jamaican's emigrated, mainly to the U.K., Canada and U.S.⁸¹ In 1965, Great Britain drastically reduced the number of emigrants it received, which left thousands of unemployed in the Jamaican job market that otherwise, would have found work off the Island. The JLP introduced a policy of "Jamaicanization", that sought to reduce foreign hold over the economy through a 2% tax on all companies that were not 51% Jamaican owned, though the policy made no timetable for implementation.⁸² PM Shearer clarified the JLP decision to not institute deadlines for "Jamaicanization" in an address to representatives of foreign capital that "the changes to be made do not have to be made instantly. Companies are working on programs which involve gradual movement over a six to seven year period from total foreign control to Jamaican control. This period will give us ample time to enable adaptations to be made and to deal with the problems which inevitably take place when change comes out."⁸³ In May of 1971 the JLP purchased the West Indies Sugar Company (WISCO), a subsidiary of British owned Tate & Lyle, after the company began to close operations on the Island.⁸⁴ As a result of diminished output, inefficiency and constant dissatisfaction among workers, the JLP was faced with either purchasing WISCO or risk termination of Island sugar production. The acquisition of WISCO forced the JLP to confront government ownership of production, which was contrary to JLP economic

⁷⁹ Carl Stone, *Democracy and Clientalism in Jamaica* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1980), 32.

⁸⁰ Omar Davies & Michael Witter, *The development of the Jamaican Economy since independence* (Kingston, Jamaica: Heinemann Publishers (Caribbean)Limited, 1989), 97.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁸² Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 197.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 197.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

policy. JLP Senator Ashenheim stated

It is not impossible that the phrase “Jamaicanization” might be misunderstood by persons abroad...we do not, and I repeat we do not, mean the nationalization of our industries and our means of production. There may be appropriate occasions for nationalization of industries...but that is not what people understand by Jamaicanization...we have not got a program of nationalization. We have a program of Jamaicanization; and, in so far as the foreign sector is concerned, Jamaicanization means not nationalization, it means not confiscation, it simply means an invitation to go into partnership with the people of Jamaica.⁸⁵

The JLP was able to achieve 5.8% growth in GDP, though unemployment nearly doubled by 1972, rising to 24%.⁸⁶ 80% of working Jamaican’s received a weekly income of \$J20.⁸⁷ The influence of bauxite/alumina over the Jamaican economy is paramount, achieving 67% of the export value in 1970.⁸⁸ Due to complete foreign ownership of bauxite/alumina and the JLP’s refusal to impose significant tariffs on foreign corporations, all capital generated belonged to foreign investors. The failure of the JLP to provide wide-spread employment precipitated the development of an informal employment sector. The lack of employment opportunities forced thousands of urban dwellers to find work in the streets. Informal employment in West Kingston was as high as 60%.⁸⁹ Though the JLP tenure is characterized by authoritarian domination over the state, the government did succeed in 1964 to have the body of Marcus Garvey exhumed and returned from Great Britain to Jamaica.⁹⁰ The JLP in an attempt to satisfy Rastafarian’s hosted a visit by Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in 1966.⁹¹ At the end of JLP tenure in 1972 the government also introduced a system of national honors and awards “to overcome the inferiority complex resulting from centuries of colonial status

⁸⁵ Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 197.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 198.

⁸⁷ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 121.

⁸⁸ Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 198.

⁸⁹ Janet T., Jalloul [The informal sector in Kingston, Jamaica: a description of literacy, educational attainment, & occupational skill] written by Janet T. Jalloul. 2.

⁹⁰ Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 196.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

and to reinforce and reflect desirable social conduct and attitudes.”⁹²

The deterioration of JLP dominance over the state led to revitalization and growth of the PNP. After assuming leadership of the PNP in 1969, Michael Manley set out to capitalize upon the growing discontent with the JLP government. In his acceptance speech Manley stressed “equality, social justice, the problems of youth, crime, victimization, unemployment, the ‘scandal of the electoral system’, corruption in high places, the need for integrity in public life, and the ‘arrogance of the leadership of the Jamaica Labor Party’.”⁹³ As PNP leader Manley tried to use JLP failures to gain party support, stressing that the time for change had come, and for Jamaica to be a “just society” it must “search for equality, which widespread unemployment denied”, if Jamaica wanted “national independence it must gain control over the commanding heights of the economy from foreign investors”, preserve democracy which had been “threatened by gerrymandering and the exclusion of...eligible adults from voting.”⁹⁴

Since the inception of the Jamaican two-party system relatively little had separated the two parties, the PNP under Manley sought to create a clear distinction in policy and ideology from that of the JLP. Manley declared that

It is a tragedy of our history that the masses are predominantly black and the privileged classes predominantly fair-skinned... We call on Jamaica to assault the economic system that perpetuates disadvantages and so feeds the delusion that race is the enemy, when poverty is the true obstacle to overcome.⁹⁵

In his address to the PNP annual conference Manley established his intention to make “economic nationalism” the foundation of PNP policy.⁹⁶ Manley also asserted that foreign policy was one of “the most important consequences of independence”, and

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 121.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 122.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 123.

Jamaica should establish foreign relations with Cuba, while clarifying that “I do not accept Castro’s method of political organization nor even all of his concepts of economic organization.”, supporting Cuba’s re-entry into the Organization of American States so long as Cuba “ceased trying to export her revolution to other countries.”⁹⁷ Manley concluded that Jamaica was faced with an economic decision of either “a low road of self-imposed, insular impotence and a high road of adventure in Caribbean regionalism leading on to the wider possibilities of third-world strength.”⁹⁸

The growth of radical ideas throughout JLP tenure meant that the PNP no longer remained the only organization advocating ideas contrary to the status quo.⁹⁹ The growth of movements that championed economic nationalism, socialism, cultural consciousness, black economic and political power allowed for the PNP to incorporate ideas and policy into the party that would represent a variety of interest groups.¹⁰⁰ The incorporation of ideologies into the PNP required that it exercise caution so as not to alienate the majority moderate voters. The PNP was faced with having to revive popular interest into political affairs that had diminished due to loss of support of both parties, as a result of the general state of crisis that existed throughout the sixties fostering dissatisfaction with “official politics and established institutions.”¹⁰¹ The rise of Michael Manley to PNP leadership and the party’s role as the only organized means of political opposition, helped increase PNP popular sentiment.¹⁰² In February of 1971 the PNP presented its parliamentary candidates at the National Arena to a crowd of 15,000.¹⁰³ PNP supporters held signs that

⁹⁷ Ibid., 124.

⁹⁸ Michael Manley, “Overcoming insularity in Jamaica”, *Foreign Affairs* (October 1970), pp. 100-110.

⁹⁹ Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 201.

¹⁰⁰ Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 201.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia

read “Change or Perish”, “Change, Baby, Change”, and “Change Time Now”, singing “Michael Row the Boat to Shore” as Manley entered.¹⁰⁴ Manley responded with a charge to PNP candidates to

“build a society based on economic and social justice; to bring to that task political and economic integrity; to work for a just distribution of wealth and the development of all citizens; to teach young people the value and dignity of work, and to provide them with training; to know their constituents well and explain the party’s ideals, plans and programs to them; and finally, ‘to strive to be efficient in yourselves’.”¹⁰⁵

As the 1972 elections approached the PNP began to further their image as the party that would bring national unity. PNP electoral tactics avoided controversial issues of Black Power and anti-imperialism, in favor of a “cautious, non-antagonistic” approach to opposition, capable of uniting the fragmented society.¹⁰⁶ The party’s populist rhetoric was meant to appeal to a “broad alliance” of farmers, youth, unemployed, professionals, workers, businessmen, and academics.¹⁰⁷ Manley himself incorporated a religious image in order to portray himself as a messiah, charged with unification of the Jamaican people’s. Appropriating the name “Joshua” and carrying the “Cane of Correction”, apparently a gift from Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, an obvious ploy to bring Rastafarian support to the party.¹⁰⁸ Manley proclaimed “Power for the People”, “It is Time for a Government of Love”, and “Better Must Come”.¹⁰⁹ PNP electoral strategy also fused Rastafarian speech and Jamaican Reggae songs such as “Small Axe”, “Beat Down Babylon”, and “Must Get a Beating”, depicting the JLP as “oppressors” and

Press, 1990), 125.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 202.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Michael Kauffman, *Jamaica under Manley: Dilemmas of Socialism & Democracy* (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1985) 71.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

“capitalist”, keeping down the “sufferers”.¹¹⁰ Manley through his fusion of Jamaican culture and religious imagery was able to project an image that “Thousands of Jamaicans came to believe that the Rod [of correction] was imbued with supernatural powers, and everywhere [Manley] appeared people wanted to touch this potent source of power...”¹¹¹

The JLP faced with widespread discontent towards its policies and the common belief that the party oversaw the decline of the wellbeing of Jamaicans, continued its long held practice of defending the status quo.¹¹² JLP electoral strategy was a “bureaucratic campaign” in the defense of tradition and stability.¹¹³ The JLP unable to counter the “charisma” of Manley, presented an image that appealed to popular sentiment and distance itself from the social and economic strife that characterized its tenure, ensured the party’s electoral defeat.¹¹⁴ The PNP won the 1972 election with 56% of the vote, taking 37 of 57 seats in the House of Representatives, as well as the PM position.¹¹⁵

Only when the PNP retreated from Fabian preoccupation with party programs and intra-party democracy, concentrating instead on fighting political warfare ‘Jamaican style’, did it begin, at the end of the [1960’s] to build the foundations for success...the PNP...having to respond to the personalism of JLP by creating a bigger and better personalism of its own.¹¹⁶

The decade of Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) rule after independence replaced a colonial overlord with a domestic one that employed coercion and rewards to subjugate Jamaica’s majority lumpen proletariat. But it was JLP hegemony that established a paradigm for Jamaican democracy rooted in the Jamaican socio-political character and

¹¹⁰ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 126.

¹¹¹ Olive Senior, *The Message is Change; A Perspective on the 1972 General Elections* (Kingston; Kingston Publishers, 1972) 65-66.

¹¹² Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 203.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 127.

¹¹⁶ Lacey, *Violence and Politics in Jamaica*, 55-6.

based on the co-option of urban blacks into an absolutist clientalist system. Upon taking power, Manley's People's National Party adopted a clientalist structure modeled on that of the JLP, and capitalized on that party's inability to alter the pre-independence socio-political structure to create one wholly Jamaican. The JLP's difficulties provided Manley's regime an opportunity to establish a state reflecting PNP party ideology. Through its synthesis of JLP clientalism and democratic socialism the PNP sought to formulate an idiosyncratic Jamaican democracy. Manley's embrace of democratic socialism provided Jamaica its first major political ideology and gave rise to a viable two party system. The subsequent escalation of party competition further antagonized an already violent rivalry for dominion over the urban electorate. The restructuring of the state around democratic socialism also sought to diminish domination by foreign capital and its influence and to redistribute wealth and resources to the greater majority of society.

The failure of the PNP socialist experiment necessitated the nation's establishment of relations with the IMF/World Bank which led to extensive borrowing that forced Jamaica into a state of economic dependency and the surrender of autonomy. Less than 20 years after achieving independence, Jamaica was again subservient to foreign power.

It was not until after its victory in the 1974 mid-term elections, that the PNP announced its program to achieve democratic socialism in Jamaica. To that point the PNP had continued the pre-existing economic policies that emphasized government sponsored employment to alleviate rampant unemployment and distribute capital amongst the disenfranchised. The PNP special employment program was the largest in Jamaican history, hiring thousands for menial tasks that served little purpose other than

ensuring the continuation of clientalism.¹¹⁷ Employment was granted exclusively to PNP members.

From 1972-1974, the PNP broadened popular support and proletarian dependency by maintaining the JLP status quo and continuing its programs and policies prior to the implementation of socialism. The PNP preserved the JLP's socio-political order and its moderate platform articulating solidarity and cultural enrichment while successfully distancing itself from public discontent with the authoritarian JLP practices. Through shrewd political maneuvering, the personalism of Manley, and his use of clientalism, the PNP established confidence with both foreign and domestic capital holders, and ensured proletarian compliance through patronage, making possible the transition towards socialism.

The initial PNP tenure was the twilight of Jamaican independence. The non-ideological campaign by Manley was successful in creating an atmosphere of solidarity. PNP policy focused on the creation of public service programmes and reformation of state. Manley stressed that the PNP government sought “a policy of equality, social justice, self-reliance and discipline.”¹¹⁸

Between 1972-1975, the PNP government initiated ambitious campaigns to address issues of national concern: the National Literacy Board to counter illiteracy; Operation Growing and Reaping Our Wealth designed to increase agricultural efficiency, production and to mobilize local farmers. The Sugar Industry Authority to improve sugar production. The sugar industry was the first to be nationalized after the JLP purchased a majority share of the Tate & Lyle Company in the mid sixties. Project Land

¹¹⁷ Carlene J. Edie. “Jamaican Political Processes: a System in search of a Paradigm” *Journal of Development Studies* Vol. 20 issue 4 (1984): 12.

¹¹⁸ David Panton. *Jamaica's Michael Manley: the great transformation (1972-1992)*, 72.

Lease of 1973 introduced three initiatives to provide increased opportunities for local farmers. The program leased small to large plots of land from 5 to 50 years, and helped provide subsidies on products necessary to farming, in addition to soil conservation assistance.¹¹⁹

The National Youth Service programme was created to place high school graduates into jobs in public schools, the literacy program and to provide vocational training. Although Manley failed to pass legislation making high school and university education free, he did provide free school uniforms for primary students. The National Housing Trust attempted to provide housing and low interest home loans through joint state--employer funding. The Trust was notable for its lottery based allocation system for selecting applicants and decreasing the possibility for patronage; a major factor in the proliferation of garrisons.

The focus on cultural development and immediate assistance programs succeeded in maintaining wide-spread support. When the PNP began to redirect its focus to address issues of rapid national deterioration and foreign policy dissent began to mount. Manley asserted that Jamaica would attempt “to construct economic alliances that give us the greatest chance to underwrite our economic independence...[a]nd...to make common cause with all developing nations of the world who share our fate.”¹²⁰ Vigorous international campaigning by Manley to promote Jamaica as a third world leader brought global attention to his administration.

Without investment in bauxite by industrialized nations interest in Jamaican affairs would be nominal. Jamaica was one of the three largest global producers of bauxite which was its major source of foreign exchange. The United States, a major

¹¹⁹Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 9.

¹²⁰David Panton. *Jamaica's Michael Manley: the great transformation (1972-1992)*, 72.

investor in Jamaican bauxite, maintained a relationship of superiority and assertion of compliance to policy with Jamaica, and an influential factor in the failure of the Manley administration.

Prior to the 1972 election Vincent de Roulet, U.S. Ambassador to Jamaica (1969-1972), convinced Manley was a socialist, sought to ensure victory for Shearer and the JLP.¹²¹ Roulet arranged a meeting between P.M. Shearer and President Nixon.¹²² Roulet testifying to the Senate sub-committee on International Development candidly spoke of Shearer as a conservative alternative to Manley.

“In the whole time I dealt with him... I never had to listen to a long speech about his little people with withering bellies and that back to Africa crap. He was a hard-broiled businessman. He knew where his bread was buttered.”¹²³

Shortly before the 72’ elections the United States Agency for International Development allocated 20 million dollars to the Shearer government; nearly double the annual U.S. assistance to Jamaica. After the election of Manley annual U.S. to Jamaica was reduced to 4million.¹²⁴

The mood of celebration over Manley’s government began to wane towards the end of 1973. Large landholders and investors expressed opposition to the imposition of a tax on all agricultural lands, even those not in full production.¹²⁵ The establishment of full diplomatic relations with Cuba further antagonized Washington. .¹²⁶

After victory in the 1974 mid-term election, Manley and the PNP began to attempt to reconstruct the Jamaican socio-political order through Democratic Socialism.

¹²¹ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 121.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ David Pantou. Jamaica's Michael Manley: the great transformation (1972-1992), 72.

¹²⁵ Ibid

¹²⁶ Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago also opened embassies in Havana.

At the 74' PNP annual conference Manley proclaimed Jamaica to be a democratic socialist state.

“The People’s National Party is committed to the belief that people perform best when they do so of their own free will. For that reason we believe in democracy... Democracy aims to give each person an equal chance... in the free election... Socialism is... [an] equal opportunity... to pursue happiness, to achieve fulfillment and to contribute to the nation. Therefore, democracy and socialism must go together to build a nation where people have equal rights and opportunities. The PNP is dedicated to equality. Therefore the PNP is dedicated to democratic socialism.”¹²⁷

Manley convinced that a non-aligned socialist Jamaica was the most viable strategy for national advancement, set out to transform the Jamaican polity into a model third world socialist nation. Manley’s pursuit of a third direction for Jamaican economic development sought advancement opportunities from both capitalist and socialist nations. His ardent international campaigning for socialism and equality helped Jamaica to briefly escape from years of subordination and compliance to the capitalist west; a singular event in the history of Independence Jamaica.

Though Manley proclaimed democratic socialism in Jamaica, the PNP did not provide any conclusive policies or objectives outlining the shift towards socialism. The PNP published “13 Principles to Democratic Socialism” articulating the need for a mixed economy, but it was a vague statement that socialism was “the single touchstone of right and wrong... that best [gave] expression to the Christian ideal of equality of all god’s children.”¹²⁸ In their construction of a model for Jamaican socialism the PNP looked to the Scandinavian system of “co-operatives, mixed economy and strong central state working for industrial democracy through worker participation.”¹²⁹

Manley thought implementing s co-operative development in the form of

¹²⁷ David Panton. *Jamaica's Michael Manley: the great transformation (1972-1992)*, 72.

¹²⁸ Carlene J. Edie. “Jamaican Political Processes: a System in search of a Paradigm” *Journal of Development Studies* Vol. 20 issue 4 (1984): 93.

¹²⁹ David Panton, *Jamaica's Michael Manley: the great transformation*. (Kingston: Kingston Publishers Limited, 1993),54.

Community Enterprise Organizations would heighten the sense of personal investment in the state. C.E.O.'s were designed to coordinate activities between local groups and communities, monitor rents and price controls.¹³⁰ C.E.O.'s were established in both rural and urban communities and varied accordingly. Rural C.E.O.'s focused on increasing agricultural production by providing food for local farmers so that they could concentrate on growing commercial crops. Rural C.E.O.'s were successful in several communities, whereas their urban counter parts became another means to perpetuate clientalism. Urban C.E.O.'s lacking production and manufacturing capabilities devolved into a state run system that allowed the PNP to provide patronage to the urban disenfranchised.

Following the declaration of socialism, Manley found it necessary to ensure the private sector that his government had no intentions of a full scale nationalization of the economy. He asserted that the national economy would only comprise of natural resources, financial institutions, and foreign trading relations.¹³¹ The PNP avowed its commitment to capitalism and assured foreign and domestic interest that all investments would be protected. Manley stated that he was "opposed...to communism passionately. I am opposed to all forms of subversion, passionately. Let us understand that it is not necessary to destroy to make change."¹³² The PNP also launched a political awareness campaign within the PNP by making mandatory attendance at socialist training seminars.¹³³

The strong foundation for capitalist enterprise in Jamaica presented the PNP with one of its greatest challenges in their pursuit of democratic socialism. Manley's

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ David Panton, *Jamaica's Michael Manley: the great transformation*. (Kingston: Kingston Publishers Limited, 1993),54.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

emboldened socialist rhetoric and global status as a champion of socialism made it increasingly difficult to avoid antagonizing vital capitalist interest, eventually leading to a mutually shared relationship of distain between capitalism and state.¹³⁴ Manley argued that capitalism involved the “exploitation of people and obliges individuals to pursue private gain at the expense of their fellow citizens without regard to any other interest.”¹³⁵

In late 1973 the Jamaican Bauxite Institute was formed to investigate the potential for increased state involvement in Bauxite production. The institute, an obvious step towards state acquisition of the bauxite mines, received popular approval. The nationalization of the Jamaican bauxite industry was one of the PNP’s first and most successful attempts at control over production. In 1974 the Jamaican government imposed a 7.5% levy upon bauxite production and agreed to purchase all lands at “book value” from Western corporations.¹³⁶ Bauxite manufacture was completely foreign owned. The agreement allowed foreign companies to lease back all lands at 7% the purchase price and guaranteed a forty year supply of bauxite from leased lands.¹³⁷ Companies then were allowed to maintain management of production through renewable ten year contracts.¹³⁸ Imposition of the bauxite levy brought a 480% increase in revenues from \$2.50 a ton to \$14.51.¹³⁹ The increased revenues were crucial in offsetting rising oil cost and the global economic downturn of the mid-seventies. The gains made from the bauxite levy were not lasting. Significant decreases in production, dropping 50% (1975-1980). The imposition of the bauxite levy raised the cost of Jamaican bauxite \$33 a ton,

¹³⁴ Not long after the Jamaican declaration of democratic socialism Michael Manley was elected Vice President of the Socialist International.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Obika Gray, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1962-1972* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 9.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 195.

much higher than major competitors Australia and Guinea.¹⁴⁰ Production decreases were also the product of foreign companies deliberately lowering production to protest the acquisition.¹⁴¹

Following the announcement of democratic socialism the PNP introduced a number of new programmes and policies designed to initiate the process towards socialism. The government founded the State Trading Authority to oversee the importation of foods, prescription medicine, construction materials, and sugar.¹⁴² After 1974 the Jamaican government extended its involvement to include radio, electricity, flour, cement, and public transportation, purchasing private shares in all. The acquisition of flour and cement companies generated public outrage that stemmed from government competition with local enterprise.

The election of 1976 was a great triumph for Manley and the PNP. With over 85% voter turnout the 56.8% PNP majority was an affirmation in Manley's leadership and the move towards democratic socialism.¹⁴³ Although the election a great success and testament to the democratic character of the Jamaican polity; the violence that proceeded it was ominous foreshadowing of what lay ahead. In June, 1976 six months before the national elections, Governor General Glasspole declared a state of national emergency.¹⁴⁴ The imposition of a state of emergency came after months of politically motivated attacks. The first was a firing on a PNP funeral procession led by Manley that marched through the JLP controlled garrison, Tivoli Gardens.¹⁴⁵ The incident was the first of three attempts on Manley's life. When accused of the shooting, the JLP did not contest the

¹⁴⁰Carlene J. Edie. "Jamaican Political Processes: a System in search of a Paradigm" *Journal of Development Studies* Vol. 20 issue 4 (1984): 42.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁴³ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 121.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 165.

charge. Rather, Seage blamed Manley for provoking the incident by marching through a JLP garrison. The Tivoli incident was only the first of many violent events that led to the imposition of a curfew and house-to-house searches in February, 1976.¹⁴⁶ Three months later an estimated fifty gunmen set ablaze a housing complex on Orange Street that claimed ten lives and left five-hundred destitute. Once the fire was set the gunman prevented the exit of residents and the entry of firefighters. Manley, certain the JLP responsible for the attacks, asserted that: thugs and murderers of the JLP...have been hiring armed gunmen to shoot their way to power...these people...trying to bring fascism to Jamaica...I have made up my mind...if they come with the gun-then he who lived by the gun shall be buried by the gun.¹⁴⁷

Shortly after the Orange Street Fire, the Peruvian ambassador to Jamaica, Fernando Rodriguez was stabbed to death.¹⁴⁸ His murder was the final catalyst for the declaration of a State of Emergency that allowed the detention of “all persons whose activities are likely to endanger the public safety.”¹⁴⁹ The State of Emergency lasted a full year, six months after the 1976 national election, in part due to strong popular support for the action.¹⁵⁰ Some 593 persons were detained, 8 of whom were prominent members of the PNP and JLP.¹⁵¹ Explain Manley characterized the events leading to the Governor General’s declaration.

January, 1975[sic, for 1976], marked a new and dangerous trend. Tragically, the events which have taken place since then have added a new dimension to violence: the dimension of urban terrorism, confrontation with the Security Forces and other agents of the State and widespread arson. This terrorism has been organized and is designed for the double political purpose of embarrassing the economy of Jamaica and undermining the confidence of the Community in the democratically elected Government.¹⁵²

The election of 1976 was the first in which the majority of PNP support was

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 169.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 171.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid., 172.

proletarian based.¹⁵³ From its inception the PNP has been a professional class based party. Manley's attempts to found a benevolent polity focused upon the disenfranchised majority alienated his business supporters, alienation that worsened when an emboldened Manley told the businessmen that there were "five flights a day to Miami." His demise was imminent.¹⁵⁴

Manley's hostile attitude towards the capitalist class resulted in the mobilization of the JLP, the Jamaican Manufacturers Association and the Jamaican Chamber of Commerce against the PNP.¹⁵⁵

The PNP shift towards a mass based party and alienation of capitalist resulted in an inversion of class based political support whereby the JLP poised itself to become the professional class party. The leadership of Seaga was crucial to JLP reascendency. Seaga the first Jamaican political leader without a trade union background, was a talented organizer and technocrat.¹⁵⁶ Though defeated in 1976, support gained from alienated PNP supporters and international foreign capitalist interest effectively brought the JLP back to relevancy and elevating Seaga to one of the island's most influential figures. In their 76' election manifesto the JLP expressed a nationalist ideology that stressed local control of the economy. The JLP also sought to convince voters that the PNP were fanatical marxist under the control of Castro.¹⁵⁷ The leadership of Seaga allowed the JLP to move past the failure of 72' and reestablish itself as a major political force in Jamaica.

¹⁵³ Carlene J. Edie. "Jamaican Political Processes: a System in search of a Paradigm" *Journal of Development Studies* Vol. 20 issue 4 (1984): 42.

¹⁵⁴ David Panton, *Jamaica's Michael Manley: the great transformation*. (Kingston: Kingston Publishers Limited, 1993), 54.

¹⁵⁵ Carlene J. Edie. "Jamaican Political Processes: a System in search of a Paradigm" *Journal of Development Studies* Vol. 20 issue 4 (1984) : 253.

¹⁵⁶ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 175.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 175.

The JLP's attempt to cast the PNP as communist subversives failed, but was a contributing factor in the escalation of political violence that preceded the 76' election. Urban violence did not begin to seriously escalate until after the failure of the JLP propaganda campaign. Following 1975 Manley argues that the JLP underwent "a serious attempt to discredit the existing electoral system... and a [sic] concentrated attempt to spread a wave of hysteria throughout the country based on the oft repeated allegation that the government communist."¹⁵⁸

"Comrades, brothers, sisters the word is love.", the opening line to a 150 Manley speeches prior to 1976, what followed was anything but.¹⁵⁹ In February, 1977 the JLP garrison of Rema in protest to the PNP refused to pay rents, PNP Minister of Housing responded with eviction, subsequently Rema residents began a riot that left one dead.¹⁶⁰ Neighboring PNP supporters unwilling to except such outrageous JLP behavior stormed Rema and proceeded to disfinistrate JLP possessions. Concurrently the PNP was faced with the task of creating a viable economic strategy capable of preventing pending economic collapse. The formulation of an economic strategy and beginning of economic negotiations with the IMF was the catalyst for a intra-party schism with the PNP. The debate over development strategies pit older moderate PNP members against their more radical young members. Though the younger outspoken leftist members more prominent it was older moderates who held political offices and maintained power within the PNP. The intensity of the debate and vigor of the leftist wing spurned moderate dissatisfaction and alienation.

The confidential IMF negotiations convinced the PNP that a domestic plan for reconstruction was the best option for

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 173.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 182.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

Jamaica.¹⁶¹ Soon after Manley reduced his salary from J\$22,000 to J\$16,000.¹⁶² The PNP alternative program was the Emergency Production Plan founded upon Jamaican self-reliance on natural and human resources, diversification of foreign economic relations focused around non-aligned foreign policy and altering of the national economic structure to a reversion back to agriculture. Following the IMF negotiations Manley asserted that Jamaica “would not accept anybody anywhere in the world telling us what to do in our own country. We are the masters in our house and in our house there shall be no other masters but ourselves. Above all we are not for sale.

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The emergency production plane did not reach fruition. Drastic deterioration of the economy, especially in manufacturing already on the brink of collapse, threatened to place 30,000 unemployed Jamaicans on the street, an outcome Manley unwilling to accept. Coupled with improvements in diplomatic relations with the United States resulting from a more receptive Carter administration and an already established friendship with both P.M. Pierre Trudeau of Canada and P.M. Callaghan of the U.K. which resulted in a “relatively painless” IMF proposal, persuaded Manley to pursue the IMF path.¹⁶⁴

Deterioration of economy by 78’ had reached a state of crisis. Inflation had grown to 34.6% and since 72’ the oil export bill increased seven-fold from \$44 million to \$331 million for the same 16.1 million barrels of oil.¹⁶⁵ Further exasperated by a 689 million dollar reduction of foreign exchange reserves to a -821.2 deficit which increased dramatically government loans.¹⁶⁶ 68% of the foreign debt was financed through

¹⁶¹ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 184.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ David Panton, *Jamaica's Michael Manley: the great transformation*. (Kingston: Kingston Publishers Limited, 1993), 52.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 53.

¹⁶⁵ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 195.

¹⁶⁶ David Panton, *Jamaica's Michael Manley: the great transformation*. (Kingston: Kingston Publishers Limited, 1993), 54.

commercial bank loans at a rate of 12-15%; double that of the previous decade.¹⁶⁷ 1972-1976 short term loans (10yrs.) grew from 30% the external debt to 75%.¹⁶⁸ Unemployment in 1978 was 30%.¹⁶⁹ With overall government growth in the second Manley tenure being -2.9%.¹⁷⁰ Exportation declined by 1.4% during both Manley governments, while every other non-oil producing third world state increased its exportation by 5.9%.¹⁷¹ Unfortunately the largest exported commodity during the Manley tenure was the professional class with over 40% immigrating.¹⁷² The massive rate of unemployment led to a 33% increase in informal employment.¹⁷³

The scarcity of employment opportunities in Jamaica forced the vast sector of unemployed to turn to the streets and attempt entrepreneurship third world style, haggling fruits, merchandise, food, services and ganja. 60% of inner Kingston residents were employed in the informal sector.¹⁷⁴ Informal employment has existed in Jamaica since the late eighteenth century when slaves would be sent by their masters to Kingston to sell goods, a practice highly advantageous to slave owners for it allowed them to maximize worker productivity and profits by forcing slaves to work both the fields and streets, and while away from the plantation, slave owners were removed from the obligation of feeding their chattel.¹⁷⁵ The informal sector is the Jamaican economy. Far removed from Wall Street, exchange rates, and foreign banks is the majority of faceless Jamaicans,

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 195.

¹⁷⁰ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 79.

¹⁷¹ David Panton, *Jamaica's Michael Manley: the great transformation*. (Kingston: Kingston Publishers Limited, 1993), 58.

¹⁷² David Panton, *Jamaica's Michael Manley: the great transformation*. (Kingston: Kingston Publishers Limited, 1993), 60.

¹⁷³ Janet T., Jalloul [The informal sector in Kingston, Jamaica: a description of literacy, educational attainment, & occupational skill] written by Janet T. Jalloul. 2.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 2.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 46.

bereft opportunity and forced to find a means to subsist. To many urban West Kingston inhabitants the streets were the only reality they knew, and when the government failed them they turned to the streets to survive.

By 1977 the Jamaican economy was in dire straits. Manley refusing to gamble with the possibility of complete deterioration of the manufacturing sector capitulated and agreed to establish an economic package with the IMF. The IMF determined that the state of the Jamaican economy was the result of increased wages fiscal deficit, state expansion, lack of investor confidence, price controls, trade restrictions, an over valued rate of exchange and state economic mismanagement.¹⁷⁶ Three months after the signing of IMF agreements Jamaica failed its first quarterly performance test by 2.6%.¹⁷⁷ The Jamaican inability to meet IMF performance requirements resulted in “one of the most savage packages ever imposed on any client government by the IMF.”¹⁷⁸ The revised IMF package Jamaica agreed to a 15% devaluation of currency to \$1.76-1.00, proceeded by further devaluations every two months, in addition to restriction on state spending, and the largest tax code in Jamaica’s history and a 15% ceiling on wage increased though inflation over 30%.¹⁷⁹ The 1978 IMF agreement pledged \$492 million assistance to Jamaica, of that the state would receive 172.¹⁸⁰

Though the 76’ election was the epoch of Manley, the PNP and Independence Jamaica, the second Manley tenure was the descent into urban hell. In January, 1978 a Jamaican Intelligence Unity surprised attacked a group of Rude Boys at the Green bay

¹⁷⁶ Carlene J. Edie. “Jamaican Political Processes: a System in search of a Paradigm” *Journal of Development Studies* Vol. 20 issue 4 (1984): 253.

¹⁷⁷ Levi, 192.

¹⁷⁸ David Panton, *Jamaica's Michael Manley: the great transformation*. (Kingston: Kingston Publishers Limited, 1993), 53.

¹⁷⁹ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 193.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 206.

firing range, killing five.¹⁸¹ With the collapse of west Kingston and subsequent onslaught of urban civil warfare, the government planned to hold the “One Love” concert featuring Bob Marley and the Wailers. One April 21, the day before the scheduled concert, Marley, his wife and manager were shot at his 56 Hope Road mansion by a large group of masked gunmen. The following day a wounded and bleeding Marley stepped onstage at the National Arena. During the concert Marley brought both Seaga and Manley to the stage. In front of over a hundred thousand Jamaicans Marley forced the two political adversaries to join hands. An inspiring moment in a year where political violence took the lives of 538 Jamaicans.¹⁸² Befitting that the man maintaining the hold between Jamaica’s political bosses was a west Kingston rudies bearing an open bullet wound, this event summarizes Independence Jamaica.

Robert Nesta Marley will always stand as one of Jamaica’s finest sons. Like anything Jamaican, Bob Marley and reggae music possesses something inherently familiar to westerners yet uniquely its own. Bob Marley brought Jamaica to the world, a put a face on a society all too overshadowed by its violent and oppressive past. Marley showed the world the beauty that lay at the heart of the Jamaican people. In doing he helped to forge a musical style unlike any. Marley a rural born peasant, former rude boy and devote Rastafarian transcended the poverty that has trapped countless millions who reside in the third world. From Harare to London Marley captivated and inspired a global audience, ironically the gangster turned pop icon message was love.

The escalation of violence that developed out of the intense rivalry between the JLP and PNP would haunt both Seaga and Manley for the remainder of their political careers. The approaching 1980 election ensured that political warfare would thrive. A

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 195

¹⁸² Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 220.

briefcase belonging to a JLP candidate and member of the Jamaican Defense Force confiscated by the government provides vivid evidence to extend of organization of the political war. Two documents contained read as follows:

Michael Manley and his government are dedicated communist and we intend to destroy them at all cost... Werewolf is now willing to take up arms against the communist regime and purge them from our shores... The high command will coordinate both the conservative and militant wings and be responsible for liaison with any other forces, local or foreign, who sympathize with the cause.

St. Ann's Area

22 trained men

100 ideological indoctrinated [sic]

300 supporters

Supplies

200 rifles

100 sub machine guns

2 barrels of gunpowder

50,000 anti government pamphlets

In April of 1980 20-30 gunmen in military attire opened fire on a JLP fundraising dance on Gold Street.¹⁸³ The Gold Street Massacre claimed 4 lives and wounded 11.¹⁸⁴ A few months' later 3 officers and 23 soldiers of the Jamaican Armed Forces and three civilians were arrested for plotting a military coupe.¹⁸⁵ The following month on July, 4 – the United States Independence day- the home of American embassy first secretary Richard Kinsman was fired upon.¹⁸⁶ Seaga responded to the attack saying:

The terrorist attack...is the latest in a series of anti-American attacks led by the government institutions, the ruling People's National Party and the Communist Workers Party all working in orchestration to spread hate and violence as part of their strategy of effecting a 'military solution'.¹⁸⁷

Seaga also dispersed a memo linking every government official to the KGB and Cuban DGI.¹⁸⁸ Soon after former P.M. Hugh Shearer was wounded when a rocket hit his

¹⁸³ Ibid., 221.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 195.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 222.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 228.

motorcade.¹⁸⁹ In Oct. a PNP candidate and his bodyguard were shot to death. Political violence led to the murder of 889 persons in 1980.¹⁹⁰

The Jamaican economy failed to pass a 1979 IMF performance test by \$150 million.¹⁹¹ The IMF urged Jamaica to cut government expenditure by \$150 million. The government convinced any cuts greater than \$100 million inconceivable as the additional \$50 million would force the layoff of 11,00 government workers destruction of social services, termination of all food subsidies, the omnibus service and literacy program, and reinstatement of full tuition at post-secondary schools.¹⁹² March, 22 1980 the PNP executive council voted unanimously to terminate relations with the IMF. “Instead of gaining greater economic independence as promised, the people now have to go to Washington to have their budget approved... Without development there is no future. If there is no future, who needs the IMF?”¹⁹³ Unfortunately for Jamaica shortly after the IMF break and announcement that the economy would not collapse, hurricane Allen claimed \$150 million in damages.¹⁹⁴

By the elections of 1980, horrific violence and economic crisis, which the majority of Jamaicans held Manley responsible for, led to an overall refutation of the Manley government. Graffiti read IMF=Is Manley’s Fault, Joshua=Judas and Manlie.¹⁹⁵ It is a great testament that despite overwhelming violence in the 80’ election 77% of the electorate participated.¹⁹⁶ 59% of the Jamaican people voted in favor of the JLP and

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 223.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 220.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 218.

¹⁹² Ibid., 218.

¹⁹³ PNP Economic Affairs Commission, the Non IMF alternative, pg.1-3,22,25-7.

¹⁹⁴ Darrell E. Levi, *Michael Manley: the Making of a Leader*. (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 220.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 229.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

Seaga, winning 51/60 H.O.R. seats.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.