Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)

Aristotle was born in Stagira, a Greek colony in Macedonia. His father, Nicodemeus, and his early ancestors had served as personal physicians to the kings of Macedonia. Married twice (his first wife died), Aristotle had two children, a daughter and a son. It was to his son, Nicomacheus (by his second wife), that he dedicated his Ethics.

At the age of seventeen, Aristotle came to Athens and joined the Academy, an intellectual community founded by Plato outside the walls of the city. Aristotle studied there for about twenty years, until Plato died in 347 B.C. For the next thirteen years, Aristotle lived outside of Athens. He taught for a time in Asia Minor, and for three years he served as the tutor of the teen-aged son of Philip II of Macedonia—the young man who would grow up to be Alexander the Great.

About 334 B.C. Aristotle returned to Athens where he established his own community of scholars, the Lyceum. Aristotle’s followers were (and still are, in some quarters) called the Peripatetics from Aristotle’s habit of lecturing while perambulating back and forth under the covered walkway (peripatos) of the Lyceum. Under his leadership, and later under that of Theophrastus, the Lyceum far outshone the Academy, which had continued in existence after the death of Plato, although under the indifferent direction of Speusippus.

In 323 B.C. as a result of the political crisis precipitated by the death of Alexander the Great, the anti-Macedonian faction in Athens charged Aristotle (and others) with corruption and impiety. Rather than permit the Athenians to commit for the second time a crime against Philosophy (as he is reported to have said), Aristotle went into exile, taking refuge with friends in the city of Chalkis on the island of Eubea. This was the place where Aristotle died soon thereafter in the summer of 322 B.C. at the age of sixty two.

The excerpt that follows is from the Nicomachean Ethics, which has been called “probably the greatest moral treatise that owes no debt to revelation.” Our text is from Books I and II where Aristotle articulates his fallacious account of happiness and
his general theory of moral virtue. It should be borne in mind that as a "moral state," virtue is a manifestation of an acquired readiness for practical rationality—the defining quality of man, for Aristotle. Moral virtue is thus a power acquired by doing, possessed with the sureness of a habit or fixed disposition, but which (contrary to the blindness and involuntariness of habit) is permeated with active intelligence and will. For Aristotle the self-sufficiency, or independence, necessary for true happiness is itself primarily the product of virtue so understood.

The Nicomachean Ethics

Book I [On Happiness]

Chapter I

[The teleological structure of human action; the relationship between ethics and politics; the appropriate standards for the study of ethics and politics]

Every art and every scientific inquiry, and similarly every action and purpose, may be said to aim at some good. Hence the good has been well defined as that at which all things aim. But it is clear that there is a difference in the ends; for the ends are sometimes activities, and sometimes results beyond the mere activities. Where there are ends beyond the action, the results are naturally superior to the activities.

As there are various actions, arts, and sciences, it follows that the ends are also various. Thus health is the end of medicine, a vessel of shipbuilding, victory of strategy, and wealth of domestic economy. It often happens that there are a number of such arts or sciences which fall under a single faculty, as the art of making bridles, and all such other arts as make the instrument of horsemanship, under horsemanship, and this again as well as every military action under strategy, and in the same way other arts or sciences under other faculties. But in all these cases the ends of the architectonic arts or sciences, whatever they may be, are more desirable than those of the subordinate arts or sciences, as it is for the sake of the former that the latter are themselves sought after. It makes no difference to the argument whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else beyond the activities as in the above mentioned sciences.

If it is true that in the sphere of action there is an end which we wish for its own sake, and for the sake of which we wish everything else, and that we do not desire all things for the sake of something else (for, if that is so, the process will go on ad infinitum, and our desire will be idle and futile) it is clear that this will be the good or supreme good. Does it not follow then that the knowledge of this supreme good is of great importance for the conduct of life, and that, if we know it, we shall be like archers who have a better chance of attaining what we want? But, if this is that case, we
must endeavour to comprehend, at least in outline, its nature, and the science or faculty to which it belongs.

It would seem that this is the most authoritative or architectonic science or faculty, and such is evidently the political. For it is the political science or faculty which determines what sciences are necessary in states, and what kind of sciences should be learnt, and how far they should be learnt by particular people. We perceive too that the faculties which are held in the highest esteem, e.g. strategy, domestic economy, and rhetoric, are subordinate to it. But as it makes use of the other practical sciences, and also legislates upon the things to be done and the things to be left undone, it follows that its end will comprehend the ends of all the other sciences, and will therefore be the true good of mankind. For although the good of an individual is identical with the good of a state, yet the good of the state, whether in attainment or in preservation, is evidently greater and more perfect. For while in an individual by himself it is something to be thankful for, it is nobler and more divine in a nation or state.

These then are the objects at which the present inquiry aims, and it is in a sense a political inquiry. But our statement of the case will adequate, if it be made with all such clearness as the subject-matter admits; for it would be as wrong to expect the same degree of accuracy in all reasonings as in all manufactures. Things noble and just, which are the subjects of investigation in political science, exhibit so great a diversity and uncertainty that they are sometimes thought to have only a conventional, and not a natural, existence. There is the same sort of uncertainty in regard to good things, as it often happens that injuries result from them; thus there have been cases in which people were ruined by wealth, or again by courage. As our subjects then and our premisses are of this nature, we must be content to indicate the truth roughly and in outline; and as our subjects and premisses are true generally but not universally, we must be content to arrive at conclusions which are only generally true. It is right to receive the particular statements which are made in the same spirit; for an educated person will expect accuracy in each subject only so far as the nature of the subject allows; he might as well accept probable reasoning from a mathematician as require demonstrative proofs from a rhetorician. But everybody is competent to judge the subjects which he understands, and is a good judge of them. It follows that in particular subjects it is a person of special education, and in general a person of universal education, who is a good judge. Hence the young are not proper students of political science, as they have no experience of the actions of life which form the premisses and subjects of the reasonings. Also it may be added that from their tendency to follow their emotions they will not study the subject to any purpose or profit, as its end is not knowledge but action. It makes no difference whether a person is young in years or youthful in character; for the defect of which I speak is not one of tune but is due to the emotional character of his life and pursuits. Knowledge is as useless to such a person as it is to an intemperate person. But where the desires and actions of people are regulated by reason, the knowledge of these subjects will be extremely valuable.
Chapter II

[The highest practical good, or the good of man, is happiness; the ground of the controversy concerning this subject]

But having said so much by way of preface as to the students of political science, the spirit in which it should be studied, and the object which we set before ourselves, let us resume our argument as follows:

As every knowledge and moral purpose aspires to some good, what is in our view the good at which the political science aims, and what is the highest of all practical goods? As to its name there is, I may say, a general agreement. The masses and the cultured classes agree in calling it happiness, and conceive that "to live well" or "to do well" is the same thing as "to be happy." But as to the nature of happiness they do not agree, nor do the masses give the same account of it as the philosophers. The former define it as something visible and palpable, e.g. pleasure, wealth, or honour; different people give different definitions of it, and often the same person gives different definitions at different times: For when a person has been ill, it is health, when he is poor, it is wealth, and, if he is conscious of his own ignorance, he envies people who use grand language above his own comprehension. Some philosophers on the other hand have held that, besides these various goods, there is an absolute good which is the cause of goodness in them all. It would perhaps be a waste of time to examine all these opinions, it will be enough to examine such as are most popular or as seem to be more or less reasonable.

But we must not fail to observe the distinction between the reasonings which proceed from first principles and the reasonings which lead up to first principles. For Plato was right in raising the difficult question whether the true way was from first principles or to first principles, as in the race-course from the judges to the goal, or vice versa. We must begin then with such facts as are known. But facts may be known in two ways, i.e. either relatively to ourselves or absolutely. It is probable then that we must begin with such facts as are known to us i.e. relatively. It is necessary therefore, if a person is to be a competent student of what is noble and just and of politics in general, that he should have received a good moral training. For the fact that a thing is so is a first principle or starting-point, and, if the fact is sufficiently clear, it will not be necessary to go on to ask the reason of it. But a person who has received a good moral training either possesses first principles, or will have no difficulty in acquiring them. But if he does not possess them, and cannot acquire them, he had better lay to heart Hesiod's lines:

Far best is he who himself all wise,
And he, too, good who listens to wise words;
But whoso is not wise nor lays to heart
Another's wisdom is a useless men.
Chapter III

[Popular views of what constitutes happiness]

But to return from our digression: It seems not unreasonable that people should derive their conception of the good or of happiness from men's lives. Thus ordinary or vulgar people conceive it to be pleasure, and accordingly approve a life of enjoyment. For there are practically three prominent lives, the sensual, the political, and thirdly, the speculative. Now the mass of men present an absolutely slavish appearance, as choosing the life of brute beasts, but they meet with consideration because so many persons in authority share the tastes of Sardanapalus. Cultivated and practical people on the other hand, identify happiness with honour, as honour is the general end of political life. But this appears too superficial for our present purpose; for honour seems to depend more upon the people who pay it than upon the person to whom it is paid, and we have an intuitive feeling that the good is something which is proper to a man himself and cannot easily be taken away from him. It seems too that the reason why men seek honour is that they may be confident of their own goodness. Accordingly they seek it on the ground of virtue; hence it is clear that in their judgment at any rate virtue is superior to honour. It would perhaps be right to look upon virtue rather than honor as being the end of the political life. Yet virtue again, it appears, lacks completeness; for it seems that a man may possess virtue and yet be asleep or inactive throughout life, and not only so but he may experience the greatest calamities and misfortunes. But nobody would call such a life a life of happiness, unless he were maintaining a paradox. It is not necessary to dwell further on this subject, as it is sufficiently discussed in the popular philosophical treatises. The third life is the speculative which we will investigate hereafter.

The life of money-making is in a sense a life of constraint, and it is clear that wealth is not the good of which we are in quest; for it is useful in part as means to something else. It would be a more reasonable view therefore that the things mentioned before, viz. sensual pleasure, honour and virtue, are ends than that wealth is, as they are things which are desired on their own account. Yet these too are apparently not ends, although much argument has been employed to show that they are. ...

Chapter V

[Formal characteristics of the highest practical good, finality and self-sufficiency]

[Let us return to our investigation of the practical good and consider what its nature may be.] For it is clearly different in different actions or arts; it is one thing in medicine, another in strategy, and so on. What then is the good in each of these instances? It is presumably that for the sake of which all else is done. This in medicine is health, in strategy, victory, in domestic architecture, a house, and so on. But in every action and purpose it is the end, as it is for the sake of the end that people all do everything else. If then there is a certain end of all action, it will be this which is the practicable good, and if there are several such ends it will be these.
Our argument has arrived by a different path at the same conclusion as before; but we must endeavour to elucidate it still further. As it appears that there are more ends than one and some of these, e.g. wealth, flutes, and instruments generally we desire as means to something else, it is evident that they are not all final ends. But the highest good is clearly something final. Hence if there is only one final end, this will be the object of which we are in search, and if there be more than one, it will be the most final of them. We speak of that which is sought after for its own sake as more final than that which is sought after as a means to something else; we speak of that which is never desired as a means to something else as more final than the things which are desired both in themselves and as means to something else; and we speak of a thing as absolutely final, if it is always desired in itself and never as a means to something else.

It seems that happiness preeminently answers to this description, as we always desire happiness for its own sake and never as a means to something else, whereas we desire honour, pleasure, intellect, and every virtue, partly for their own sakes (for we should desire them independently of what might result from them) but partly also as being means to happiness, because we suppose they will prove the instruments of happiness. Happiness on the other hand, nobody desires for the sake of these things, nor indeed as a means to anything else at all.

We come to the same conclusion if we start from the consideration of self-sufficiency, if it may be assumed that the final good is self-sufficient. But when we speak of self-sufficiency, we do not mean that a person leads a solitary life all by himself, but that he has parents, children, wife, and friends, and fellow citizens in general, as man is naturally a social being. But here it is necessary to prescribe some limit; for if the circle be extended so as to include parents, descendants, and friends' friends, it will go on indefinitely. Leaving this point, however, for future investigation, we define the self-sufficient as that which taken by itself, makes life desirable, and wholly free from want, and this is our conception of happiness.

Again, we conceive happiness to be the most desirable of all things, and that not merely as one among other good things. If it were one among other good things, the addition of the smallest good would increase its desirableness; for the accession makes a superiority of goods, and the greater of two goods is always the more desirable. It appears then that happiness is something final and self-sufficient, being the end of all action.

Chapter VI

[Aristotle's philosophical definition of happiness in light of the function, or "proper work," of man]

Perhaps, however, it seems a truth which is generally admitted, that happiness is the supreme good; what is wanted is to define its nature a little more clearly. The best way of arriving at such a definition will be probably be to ascertain the function of Man. For, as with a flute-player, a statuary, or any artisan, or in fact anybody who has a definite function and action, his goodness, or excellence seems to lie in his function, so it would seem to be with Man, if indeed he has a definite function. Can it be said then that, while a carpenter and a cobbler have definite functions and actions, Man, unlike them, is naturally functionless? The reasonable view is that, as the eye,
the hand, the foot, and similarly each several part of the body has a definite function, so Man may be regarded as having definite function apart from all these. What then, can this function be? It is not life; for life is apparently something which man shares with the plants; and it is something peculiar to him that we are looking for. We must exclude therefore the life of nutrition and increase. There is next what may be called the life of sensation. But this too, is apparently shared by Man with horses, cattle, and all other animals. There remains what I may call the practical life of the rational part of Man's being. But the rational part is two fold; it is rational partly in the sense of being obedient to reason, and partly in the sense of possessing reason and intelligence. The practical life too may be conceived of in two ways, viz., either as a moral state, or as a moral activity. But we must understand it by it the life of activity, as this seems to be the truer form of the conception.

The function of Man then is an activity of soul in accordance with reason, or not independently of reason. Again the functions of a person of a certain kind, and of such a person who is good of his kind e.g. of a harpist and a good harpist, are in our view generically the same, and this view is true of people of all kinds without exception, the superior excellence being only an addition to the function; for it is the function of a harpist to play the harp, and of a good harpist to play the harp well. This being so, if we define the function of Man as a kind of life, and this life as an activity of soul, or a course of action in conformity with reason, if the function of a good man is such activity or action of a good and noble kind, and if everything is successfully performed when it is performed in accordance with its proper excellence, it follows then that the good of man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue or, if there be more virtues than one, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue. But it is necessary to add the words "in a complete life." For as one swallow or one day does not make a spring, so one day or a short time does not make a fortunate or happy man. ...

Book II [On Moral Virtue]

Chapter I

[Moral virtue acquired by repetition]

Virtue or excellence being twofold, partly intellectual and partly moral, intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered mainly by teaching; it therefore demands experience and time. Moral virtue on the other hand is the outcome of habit. From this fact it is clear that no moral virtue is implanted in us by nature; a law of nature cannot be altered by habituation. Thus a stone naturally tends to fall downwards, and it cannot be habituated or trained to rise upwards, even if we were to habituate it by throwing it upwards ten thousand times; nor again can fire be trained to sink downwards, nor anything else that follows one natural law be habituated or trained to follow another. It is neither by nature then nor in defiance of nature that virtues are implanted in us. Nature gives us the capacity of receiving them, and that capacity is perfected by habit.

Again, if we take the various natural powers which belong to us, we first acquire the proper faculties and afterwards display the activities. It is clearly so with the senses. It was not by seeing frequently or hearing frequently that we acquired the
senses of seeing or hearing; on the contrary it was because we possessed the senses that
we made use of them, not by making use of them that we obtained them. But the virtues
we acquire by first exercising them, as is the case with all the arts, for it is by doing what
we ought to do when we have learnt the arts themselves; we become e.g. builders by
building and harpists by playing the harp. Similarly it is by doing just acts that we
become just, by doing temperate acts that we become temperate, by doing courageous
acts that we become courageous. The experience of states is a witness to this truth, for it
is by training the habits that legislators make the citizens good. This is the object which
all legislators have at heart; if a legislator does not succeed in it, he fails of his purpose,
and it constitutes the distinction between a good polity and a bad one.
Again, the causes and means by which any virtue is produced and by which it is
destroyed are the same; and it is equally so with any art; for it is by playing the harp that
both good and bad harpists are produced and the case of builders and of all other artisans
is similar, as it is by building well that they will be good builders and by building badly
that they will be bad builders. If it were not so, there would be no need of anybody to
teach them; they would all be born good or bad in their several trades. The case of the
virtues is the same. It is by acting in such transactions as take place between man and
man that we become either just or unjust. It is by acting in the face of danger and by
habituating ourselves to fear or courage that we become either cowardly or courageous. It
is much the same with our desires and angry passions. People become temperate and
gentle, others licentious and passionate according as they conduct themselves in one way
or another in particular circumstances. In a word moral states depend upon the
differences of the activities. Accordingly the difference between one training of the habits
and another from early days is not a light matter, but is serious or rather all-important.
Chapter n
[Method in practical philosophy; moral virtue involves an avoidance of excess and
deficiency]
Our present study is not, like other studies, purely speculative in its intention; for the
object of our enquiry is not to know the nature of virtue but to become ourselves virtuous,
as that is the sole benefit which it conveys. It is necessary therefore to consider the right
way of performing actions, for it is actions as we have said that determine the character
of the resulting moral states.
That we should act in accordance with right reason is a common general principle, which
may here be taken for granted. The nature of right reason, and its relation to the virtues
generally, will be subjects of discussion hereafter. But it must be admitted at the outset
that all reasoning upon practical matters must be like a sketch in outline, it cannot be
scientifically exact. We began by laying down the principle that the kind of reasoning
demanded in any subject must be such as the subject-matter itself allows; and questions
of practice and expediency no more admit of invariable rules than questions of health.
But if this if true of general reasoning upon ethics, still more true is it that scientific
exactitude is impossible in reasoning upon particular ethical cases. They do not fall
under any art or any law, but the agents themselves are always bound to pay regard to the circumstances of the moment as much as in medicine or navigation.

Still, although such is the nature of the present argument, we must try to make the best of it.

The first point to be observed then is that in such matters as we are considering deficiency and excess are equally fatal. It is so, as we observe, in regard to health and strength; for we must judge of what we cannot see by the evidence of what we do see. Excess or deficiency of gymnastic exercise is fatal to strength. Similarly an excess or deficiency of meat and drink is fatal to health, whereas a suitable amount produces, augments and sustains it. It is the same then with temperance, courage, and the other virtues. A person who avoids and is afraid of everything and faces nothing becomes a coward; a person who is not afraid of anything but is ready to face everything becomes foolhardy. Similarly he who enjoys every pleasure is licentious; he who eschews all pleasures like a boor is an insensible sort of person. For temperance and courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency but preserved by the mean state.

Again, not only are the causes and the agencies of production, increase and destruction in the moral states the same, but the sphere of their activity will be proved to be the same also. It is so in other instances which are more conspicuous, e.g. in strength; for strength is produced by taking a great deal of food and undergoing a great deal of labour, and it is the strong man who is able to take most food and to undergo most labour. The same is the case with the virtues. It is by abstinence from pleasures that we become temperate, and, when we have become temperate, we are best able to abstain from them. So too with courage; it is by habituating ourselves to despise and face alarms that we become courageous, and, when we have become courageous, we shall be best able to face them.

Chapter III

[The pleasure in doing virtuous acts as a sign that the virtuous moral state has been acquired]

The pleasure or pain which follows upon actions may be regarded as a test of a person's moral state. He who abstains from physical pleasures and feels delight in so doing is temperate; but he who feels pain at so doing is licentious. He who faces dangers with pleasure, or at least without pain, is courageous; but he who feels pain at facing them is a coward. For moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains. It is pleasure which makes us do what is base, and pain which makes us abstain from doing what is noble. Hence the importance of having had a certain training from very early days, as Plato says, such training as produces pleasure and pain at the right objects; for this is the true education.

Again, if the virtues are concerned with actions and emotions, and every action and every emotion is attended by pleasure and pain, this will be another reason why virtue should be concerned with pleasures and pains. There is also a proof of this fact in the use of pleasure and pain as a means of punishment; punishments are in a sense remedial measures, and the means employed as remedies are naturally the opposites of the diseases to which they are applied. Again, as we said before, every moral state of the soul is in its nature relative to, and concerned with, the thing by which it is
naturally made better or worse. But pleasures and pains are the causes of vicious moral states, if we pursue and avoid such pleasures and pains as are wrong, or pursue and avoid them at the wrong time or in the wrong manner, or in any other of the various ways in which it is logically possible to do wrong. Hence it is that people actually define the virtues as certain apathetic or quiescent states; but they are wrong in using this absolute language, and not qualifying it by the addition of the right or wrong manner, time and so on.

It may be assumed then that moral virtue tends to produce the best action in respect of pleasures and pains, and that vice is its opposite. But there is another way in which we may see the same truth. There are three things which influence us to desire them, viz. the noble, the expedient, and the pleasant; and three opposite things which influence us to eschew them, viz. the shameful, the injurious, and the painful. The good man then will be likely to take a right line, and the bad man to take a wrong one, in respect of all these, but especially in respect of pleasure; for pleasure is felt not only by Man only but by the lower animals, and is associated with all things that are matters of desire, as the noble and the expedient alike appear pleasant. Pleasure too is fostered in us, all from early childhood, so that it is difficult to get rid of the emotion of pleasure, as it is deeply ingrained in our life. Again, we make pleasure and pain in a greater or less degree the standard of our actions. It is inevitable therefore that our present study should be concerned from first to last with pleasures and pains; for right or wrong feelings of pleasure or pain have a material influence upon actions. Again, it is more difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, as Heraclitus says, and it is not what is easy but what is comparatively difficult that is in all cases the sphere of art or virtue, as the value of success is proportionate to the difficulty. This then is another reason why moral virtue and political science should be exclusively occupied with pleasures and pains; for to make a good use of pleasures and pains is to be a good man, and to make a bad use of them is to be a bad man.

We may regard it then as established that virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains, that the causes which produce it are also the means by which it is augmented, or, if they assume a different character, is destroyed, and that the sphere of its activity is the things which were themselves the causes of its production.

Chapter IV
[The distinction between being virtuous and doing a virtuous act; the difference between virtue and art]

But it may be asked what we mean by saying that people must become just by doing what is just and temperate by doing what is temperate. For if they do what is just and temperate in the same way as, if they practice grammar and music, they are proved to be grammarians and musicians.

But is not the answer that the case of the arts is not the same? For a person may do something that is grammatical either by chance or at the suggestion of somebody else; hence he will not be a grammarian unless he not only does what is grammatical but does it in a grammatical manner, i.e. in virtue of the grammatical knowledge which he possesses.

There is another point too of difference between the arts and the virtues. The productions of art have their excellence in themselves. It is enough therefore that,
Aristotle II
when they are produced, they should be of certain character. But actions in accordance
with virtue are not e.g. justly or temperately performed because they are in
themselves just or temperate. It is necessary that the agent at the first place that he should
know what he is doing, secondly that he should do it as an instance of a settled and
immutable moral state. If it be a question whether a person possesses any art, these
conditions, except indeed the condition of knowledge, are not taken into account; but if it
be a question of possessing the virtues, the mere knowledge is of little or no avail, and it
is the other conditions, which are the result of frequently performing just and temperate
actions, that are not of slight but of absolute importance. Accordingly deeds are said to be
just and temperate, when they are such as a just or temperate person would do, and a just
and temperate person is not merely one who does these deeds but one who does them in
the spirit of the just and the temperate.
It may fairly be said then that a just man becomes just by doing what is just and a
temperate man becomes temperate by doing what is temperate, and if a man did not so
act, he would not have so much as a chance of becoming good. But most people, instead
of doing such actions, take refuge in theorizing; they imagine that they are philosophers
and that philosophy will make them virtuous; in fact they behave like people who listen
attentively to their doctors but never do anything that their doctors tell them. But it is as
improbable that a healthy state of the soul will be produced by this kind of philosophizing
as that a healthy state of the body will be produced by this kind of medical treatment.
Chapter V.
[Definition of moral virtue: the genus-a "moral state"
We have next to consider the nature of virtue. Now, as the qualities of the soul are
three, viz. emotions, faculties and moral states, it follows that virtue must be one of
the three. By the emotions I mean desire, anger, fear, courage, envy, joy, love, hatred,
regret, emulation, pity, in a word whatever is attended by pleasure or pain. And I call
those moral states in respect of which we are well or ill disposed towards the
emotions, ill-disposed e.g. towards the passion of anger, if our anger be too violent or too
feeble, and well-disposed if it be duly moderated, and similarly towards the other
emotions.
Now neither the virtues nor the vices are emotions; for we are not called good or
evil in respect of our emotions but in respect of our virtues or vices. Again, we are not
praised or blamed in respect of our emotions; a person is not praised for being afraid or
being angry, nor blamed for being angry, nor blamed for being angry in the absolute
sense, but only for being angry in a certain way; but we are praised or blamed in respect
of our virtues or vices. Again, whereas we are angry or afraid without deliberate purpose,
the virtues are in some sense deliberate purposes, or do not exist in the absence of
deliberate purpose. It may be added that while we are said to be moved in respect of our
emotions, in respect of our virtues or vices we are not said to be moved but to have
certain disposition.
These reasons also prove that the virtues are not faculties. For we are not called either
good or bad, nor are we praised or blamed, as having an abstract capacity for emotion.
Also while Nature gives us our faculties, it is not Nature that makes us
good or bad, but this is a point which we have already discussed. If then the virtues are
neither emotions nor faculties, it remains that they must be moral states.
Nichomachean Ethics
Chapter VI

[Definition of moral virtue: the specific difference—a disposition to choose the mean]

The nature of virtue has been now generically described. But it is not enough to state merely that virtue is a moral state, we must also describe the character of that moral state. It must be laid down then that every virtue or excellence has the effect of producing a good condition of that of which it is a virtue or excellence, and of enabling it to perform its function well. Thus the excellence of the eye makes the eye good and its function good, as it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly, the excellence of the horse makes a horse excellent and good at racing, at carrying its rider and at facing the enemy.

If then this is universally true, the virtue or excellence of man will be such a moral state as makes a man good and able to perform his proper function well. We have already explained how this will be the case, but another way of making it clear will be to study the nature or character of this virtue.

Now in everything, whether it be continuous or discrete, it is possible to take a greater, a smaller, or an equal amount, and this either absolutely or in relation to ourselves, the equal being a mean between excess and deficiency. By the mean in respect of the thing itself, or the absolute mean, I understand that which is equally distant from both extremes; and this is one and the same thing for everybody. By the mean considered relatively to ourselves I understand that which is neither too much nor too little; but this is not one thing, nor is it the same for everybody. Thus if 10 be too much and 2 too little we take 6 as the mean in respect of the thing itself; for 6 is as much greater than 2 as it is less than 10, and this is a mean in arithmetical proportion. But the mean considered relatively to ourselves must not be ascertained in this way.

It does follow that if 10 pounds of meat be too much and 2 be too little for a man to eat, a trainer will order him 6 pounds, as this may itself be too much or too little for the person who is to take it; it will be too little e.g. for Milo, but too much for a beginner in gymnastics. It will be the same with running and wrestling; the right amount will vary with the individual. This being so, everybody who understands his business avoids alike excess and deficiency; he seeks and chooses the mean, not the absolute mean, but the mean considered relatively to ourselves.

Every science then performs its function well, if it regards the mean and refers the work which it produces to the mean. This is the reason why it is usually said of successful works that it is impossible to take anything from them or to add anything to them, which implies that excess or deficiency is fatal to excellence but that the mean state ensures it. Good artists too, as we say, have an eye to the mean in their works. But virtue, like Nature herself, is more accurate and better than any art; virtue therefore will aim at the mean—I speak of moral virtue, as it is moral virtue which is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is these which admit of excess and deficiency and the mean. Thus it is possible to go too far, or not to go far enough, in respect of fear, courage, desire, anger, pity, and pleasure and pain generally, and the excess and the deficiency are alike wrong; but to experience these emotions at the right times and on the right occasions and towards the right persons and for the right causes and in the right manner is the mean or the supreme good, which is characteristic of virtue. Similarly there may be excess, deficiency, or the mean, in
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guard to actions. But virtue is concerned with emotions and actions, and here excess is an error and deficiency a fault, whereas the mean is successful and laudable, and success and merit are both characteristics of virtue.

It appears then that virtue is a mean state, so far at least as it aims at the mean. Again, there are many different ways of going wrong; for evil is in its nature infinite, to use the pythagorean figure, but good is finite. But there is only one possible way of going right. Accordingly the former is easy and the latter difficult; it is easy to miss the mark but difficult to hit it. This again is a reason why excess and deficiency are characteristic of vice and the mean state a characteristic of virtue.

For good is simple, evil manifold.

Virtue then is a state of deliberate moral purpose consisting in a mean that is relative to ourselves, the mean being determined by reason, or as a prudent man would determine it. It is a mean state firstly as lying between two vices, the vice of excess on one hand, and the vice of deficiency on the other, and secondly because, whereas the vices either fall short of or go beyond what is proper in the emotions and action, virtue not only discovers but embraces the mean.

Accordingly, virtue, if regarded in its essence or theoretical conception, is a mean state, but, if regarded from the point of view of the highest good, or of excellence it is an extreme.

But it is not every action or every emotion that admits of a mean state. There are some whose every name implies wickedness, e.g. malice, shamelessness, and envy, among emotions, or adultery, theft, and murder among actions. All these, and others like them are censured as being intrinsically wicked, not merely the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is never possible then to be right in respect of them; they are always sinful. Right or wrong in such actions as adultery does not depend on our committing them with the right person, at the right time or in the right manner; on the contrary it is sinful to do anything of the kind at all. It would be equally wrong then to suppose that there can be a mean state or an excess or deficiency in unjust, cowardly or licentious conduct; for if it were so, there would be a mean state of an excess or of a deficiency, an excess of an excess, and a deficiency of a deficiency. But as in temperance and courage, there can be no excess or deficiency, because the mean is, in a sense, an extreme, so too in these cases there cannot be a mean or an excess or deficiency, but, however the acts may be done, they are wrong. For it is a general rule that an excess or deficiency does not admit of a mean state, nor a mean state of an excess or deficiency.

Chapter VII. [The definition of moral virtue exemplified by reference to the particular virtues] But it is not enough to lay down this as a general rule; it is necessary to apply it to particular cases, as in reasonings upon actions general statements, although they are broader, are less exact than particular statements. For all action refers to particulars, and it is essential that our theories should harmonize with the particular cases to which they apply.
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In regard to feelings of fear and confidence, courage is a mean state. On the side of excess, he whose fearlessness is excessive has no name, as often happens, but he whose confidence is excessive is foolhardy, while he whose timidity is excessive and whose confidence is deficient is a coward.

In respect of pleasures and pains, although not indeed of all pleasures and pains, and to a less extent in respect of pains than of pleasures, the mean state is temperance, the excess is licentiousness. We never find people who are deficient in regard to pleasure; according to such people again have not received a name, but we may call them insensible.

As regards the giving and taking of money, the mean state is liberality, the excess and deficiency are prodigality and illiberality. Here the excess and deficiency take opposite forms; for while the prodigal man is excessive in spending and deficient in taking, the illiberal man is excessive in taking and deficient in spending.

In respect of money there are other dispositions as well. There is the mean state which is magnificence; for the magnificent man, as having to do with large sums of money, differs from the liberal man who has to do only with small sums; and the excess corresponding to it is bad taste or vulgarity, the deficiency is meanness.

These are different from the excess and deficiency of liberality; what the difference is will be explained hereafter.

In respect of honour and dishonour the mean state is highmindedness, the excess is what is called vanity, the deficiency littlemindedness. Corresponding to liberality, which, as we said, differs from magnificence as having to do not with great but with small sums of money, there is a moral state which has to do with the petty honour and is related to highmindedness which has to do with great honour; for it is possible to aspire to honour in the right way, or in a way which is excessive or insufficient, and if a person's aspirations are excessive, he is called ambitious, if they are deficient, he is called unambitious, while if they are between the two, he has no name. The dispositions too are nameless, except that the disposition of the ambitious person is called proper ambition.

The consequence is that the extremes lay claim to the mean or intermediate place. We ourselves speak of one who observes the mean sometimes as ambitious, and at other times as unambitious; we sometimes praise an ambitious, and at other times an unambitious person. The reason for our doing so will be stated in due course, but let us now discuss the other virtues in accordance with the method which we have followed hitherto.

Anger, like other emotions, has its excess, its deficiency, and its mean state. It may be said that they have no names, but as we call one who observes the mean gentle, we will call the mean state gentleness. Among the extremes, if a person errs on the side of excess, he may be called passionate and his vice passionateness, if on that of deficiency, he may be called impassive and his deficiency impassivity.

There are also three other mean states with a certain resemblance to each other, and yet with a difference. For while they are all concerned with intercourse in speech and action, they are different in that one of them is concerned with truth in such intercourse, and the others with pleasantness, one with pleasantness in the various circumstances of life. We must therefore discuss these states in order to make it clear that in all cases it is the mean state which is an object of praise, and the extremes are neither right nor laudable but censurable. It is true that these mean and extreme states are generally nameless, but we must do our best here as elsewhere to give them a name, so that our argument may be clear and easy to follow.
In the matter of truth then, he who observes the mean may be called truthful, and the mean state *truthfulness*. Pretence, if it takes the form of exaggeration, is boastfulness, and one who is guilty of pretense is a boaster; but if it takes the form of depreciation it is irony, and he who is guilty of it is ironical.

As regards pleasantness in amusement, he who observes the mean is witty, and his disposition *witlessness*; the excess is buffoonery, and he who is guilty of it a buffoon, whereas he who is deficient in wit may be called a boor and his moral state boorishness. As to the other kind of pleasantness, viz. pleasantness in life, he who is pleasant in a proper way is friendly, and his mean state *friendliness*; but he who goes too far, if he has no ulterior object in view, is obsequious, while if his object is self interest, he is a flatterer, and he who does not go far enough and always makes himself unpleasant is a quarrelsome and morose sort of person.

There are also mean states in the emotions and in the expression of the emotions. For although *modesty* is not a virtue, yet a modest person is praised as if he were virtuous; for here too one person is said to observe the mean and another to exceed it, as e.g. the bashful man who is never anything but modest, whereas a person who has insufficient modesty or no modesty at all is called shameless, and one who observes the mean modest.

*Righteous indignation*, again, is a mean state between envy and malice. They are all concerned with the pain and pleasure which we feel at the fortunes of our neighbours. A person who is rightfully indignant is pained at the prosperity of the undeserving; but the envious person goes further and is pained at anybody's prosperity, and the malicious person is so far from being pained that he actually rejoices at misfortunes.

We shall have another opportunity however of discussing these matters. But in regard to *justice*, as the word is used in various senses, we will afterwards define those senses and explain how each of them is a mean state. And we will follow the same course with the intellectual virtues.

Chapter vm

[Opposition of virtues and vices; extremes opposed to each other and to the mean]

There are then three dispositions, two being vices, viz. one the vice of excess and the other that of deficiency, and one of virtue, which is the mean state between them; and they are all in a sense mutually opposed. For the extremes are opposed both to the mean and to each other, and the mean is opposed to the extremes. For as the equal if compared with less is greater but if compared with the greater is less, so the mean states, whether in the emotions or in actions, if compared with the deficiencies, are excessive, but if compared with the excesses are deficient. Thus the courageous man appears foolhardy as compared with the coward but cowardly as compared with the foolhardy. Similarly, the temperate man appears licentious as compared with the insensible but insensible as compared with the licentious, and the liberal man appears prodigal as compared with the illiberal, but illiberal as compared with the prodigal.
The result is that the extremes mutually repel and reject the mean; the coward calls the courageous man foolhardy, but the foolhardy man calls him cowardly, and so on in the other cases.

But while there is this mutual opposition between the extremes and the mean, there is greater opposition between the two extremes than between either extreme and the mean; for they are further removed from each other than from the mean, as the great from the small and the small from the great than both from the equal. Again, while some extremes exhibit more or less similarity to the mean, as there is the greatest possible dissimilarity between the extremes. But things which are furthest removed from each other are defined to be opposites; hence the further things are removed, the greater is the opposition between them.

It is in some cases the deficiency and in others the excess which is the more opposed to the mean. Thus it is not foolhardiness the excess, but cowardice the deficiency that is more opposed to courage, nor is it insensibility the deficiency, but licentiousness the excess which is the more opposed to temperance. There are two reasons why this should be so. One lies in the nature of the thing itself; for as one of the two extremes is the nearer and more similar to the mean, it is not this extreme, but its opposite, that we chiefly set against the mean. For instance, as it appears that foolhardiness is more similar and nearer to courage than cowardice, it is cowardice that we chiefly set against courage; for things further removed from the mean seem to be more opposite to it. The reason lies in the nature of the matter itself; there is a second which lies in our own nature. Thus we ourselves are naturally more inclined to pleasures than to their opposites and are more prone therefore to licentiousness than to decorum. Accordingly we speak of those things, in which we are more likely to run to great lengths, as being more opposed to the mean. Hence it follows that licentiousness which is an excess is more opposed to temperance than insensibility.

Chapter IX. [Difficulty of the virtuous life; rules for attaining the mean] It has now been sufficiently shown that moral virtue is a mean state, and in what sense it is a mean state; it is a mean state as lying between two vices, a vice of excess on the one side and the vice of deficiency on the other, and as aiming at the mean in the emotions and actions.

That is the reason why it is so hard to be virtuous; for it is always hard work to find the mean in anything, e.g. it is not everybody, but only a man of science, who can find the mean or centre of a circle. So too anybody can get angry— that is an easy matter—and anybody can give or spend money, but to give it to the right persons, to give the right cause and in the right way, this is not what anybody can do, nor is it easy. That is the reason why it is rare and laudable and noble to do well. Accordingly one who aims at the mean must begin by departing from the extreme which is the more contrary to the mean; he must act in the spirit of Calypso's advice,

Far from this smoke and swell keep thou thy bark.
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For of the two extremes one is more sinful than the other. As it is difficult then to hit the mean exactly, we must take the second best course, as the saying is, and choose the lesser of two evils, and this we shall best do in the way that we have described, i.e. by steering clear of the evil which is further from the mean. We must also observe the things to which we are ourselves particularly prone, as different natures have different inclinations, and we may ascertain what these are by a consideration of our feelings of pleasure and pain. And then we must drag ourselves from what is wrong that we shall arrive at the mean, as we do when we pull a crooked stick straight.

But in all cases we must especially be on our guard against what is pleasant and against pleasure, as we are not impartial judges of pleasure. Hence our attitude towards pleasure must be like that of the elders of the people in the Iliad towards Helen, and we must never be afraid of applying the words they use; for if we dismiss pleasure as they dismissed Helen, we shall be less likely to go wrong. It is by action of this kind, to put it summarily, that we shall best succeed in hitting the mean.

It may be admitted that this is a difficult task, especially in particular cases. It is not easy to determine e.g. the right manner, objects, occasions, and duration of anger. There are times when we ourselves praise people who are deficient in anger, and call them gentle, and there are times when we speak of people who exhibit a savage temper as spirited. It is not however one who deviates a little from what is right, but one who deviates a great deal, whether on the side of excess or of deficiency, that is censured; for he is sure to be found out. Again, it is not easy to decide theoretically how far and to what extent a man may go before he becomes censurable, but neither is it easy to define theoretically anything else within the region of perception; such things fall under the head of particulars, and our judgment of them depends upon our perception.

So much then is plain, that the mean state is everywhere laudable, but that we ought to incline at one time towards the excess and at another towards the deficiency; for this will be our easiest manner of hitting the mean, or in other words of attaining excellence.