Francis Bacon
(1561-1626)

Francis Bacon was acknowledged in Elizabethan England as the most comprehensive genius of the age. Like Aristotle, he thought systematically about the acquisition of all knowledge whatsoever. A man for whom the intellect was a practical instrument, he served in a succession of important government posts under King James I, rising to Lord High Chancellor. He was knighted and given the titles Baron Verulam of Verulam and Viscount St. Albans. In his spare time and after his removal from office in 1621, he devoted himself to scientific experiments and the promotion of inductive logic.

Bacon has long been viewed as the father of modern Scientific Method. His monumental but unfinished work, Instauratio Magna, "The Great Restoration," was intended to restore forward momentum to human history. He viewed humankind as "the servant and interpreter of Nature" who must know nature in order to subdue it; therefore, he wrote, "knowledge and human power are synonymous." The engine of human progress had stalled because the store of human knowledge was unreliable, incomplete, and misleading. To Bacon, those authors of the late Middle Ages such as Thomas Aquinas who had made Aristotle a "Dictator" (i.e., an "Authority") were responsible for much of the intellectual confusion that followed. The excerpts below are from that part of the Instauratio magna called the Novum Organum, the "New Instrument," a reference to Aristotle's Organon. Bacon's new instrument for understanding--induction--is intended to replace deduction, the instrument of Aristotle. Using the method of induction, Bacon believes, humans can assemble a new and correct "interpretation of things."

Bacon is the first of the modern thinkers to suggest that by using the correct procedural method we can provide for our knowledge--or for our practice--a kind of insurance against the errors of human emotion and fallibility. To clear the ground for a new beginning, we must become aware of the tendencies of our own thinking processes to mislead us. Bacon divides these "idols and false notions" into four classes. The word "idol" is from the Greek "eidolon," "phantom or apparition." Bacon intends this original meaning, not the later one of "pagan image."

His work, written in Latin to reach as large a learned readership as possible, included models for gathering of data and basing conclusions on them. Had it been completed according to original plan, the final section would have been an encyclopedia of all knowledge, for Bacon was convinced that humans, once set straight, would soon surpass the knowledge amassed by all previous civilizations. Although Bacon's own scientific experiments contributed little, his promotion of science and scientific thinking as a means of improving man's life in this world was, and continues to be, extremely influential.
XXXIX  [Introduction: the Idols of the Mind]

There are four classes of Idols which beset men's minds. To these for distinction's sake I have assigned names,—calling the first class Idols of the Tribe; the second, Idols of the Cave; the third, Idols of the Market-place; the fourth, Idols of the Theatre.

XL  [Remedy for Intellectual Idolatry: "true induction"]

The formation of ideas and axioms by true induction is no doubt the proper remedy to be applied for the keeping off and clearing away of idols. To point them out, however, is of great use; for the doctrine of Idols is to the Interpretation of Nature what the doctrine of the refutation of Sophisms is to common Logic.

XLI  [Preliminary Definition: The Idols of the Tribe]

The Idols of the Tribe have their foundation in human nature itself, and in the tribe or race of men. For it is a false assertion that the sense of man is the measure of things. On the contrary, all perceptions as well of the sense as of the mind are according to the measure of the individual and not according to the measure of the universe. And the human understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discours the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it.

XLII  [Preliminary Definition: The Idols of the Cave]

The Idols of the Cave are the idols of the individual man. For every one (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den of his own, which refracts and discolors the light of nature; owing either to his own proper and peculiar nature; or to his education and conversation with others; or to the reading of books, and the authority of those whom he esteems and admires; or to the differences of impressions, accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and predisposed or in a mind indifferent and settled; or the like. So that the spirit of man (according as it is meted out to different individuals) is in fact a thing variable and full of perturbation, and governed as it were by chance. Whence it was well observed by Heraclitus that men look for sciences in their own lesser worlds, and not in the greater or common world.

XLIII  [Preliminary Definition: The Idols of the Marketplace]

There are also Idols formed by the intercourse and association of men with each other, which I call Idols of the Market-place, on account of the commerce and consort
of men there. For it is by discourse that men associate; and words are imposed according to the apprehension of the vulgar. And therefore the ill and unfit choice of words wonderfully obstructs the understanding. Nor do the definitions or explanations, wherewith in some things learned men are wont to guard and defend themselves, by any means set the matter right. But words plainly force and overrule the understanding, and throw all into confusion, and lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies.

XLIV [Preliminary Definition: The Idols of the Theatre]

Lastly, there are Idols which have immigrated into men's minds from the various dogmas of philosophies, and also from wrong laws of demonstration. These I call Idols of the Theatre; because in my judgment all the received systems are but so many stageplays, representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion. Nor is it only of the systems now in vogue, or only of the ancient sects and philosophies that I speak, for many more plays of the same kind may yet be composed and in like artificial manner set forth, seeing that errors the most widely different have nevertheless causes for the most part alike. Neither again do I mean this only of entire systems, but also of many principles and axioms in science, which by tradition, credulity, and negligence have come to be received.

But of these several kinds of Idols I must speak more largely and exactly, that the understanding may be duly cautioned.

XLV [Idols of the Tribe: the prejudice of assuming too much order in things]

The human understanding is of its own nature prone to suppose the existence of more order and regularity in the world than it finds. And though there be many things in nature which are singular and unmatched, yet it devises for them parallels and conjugates and relatives which do not exist. Hence the fiction that all celestial bodies move in perfect circles. . . . And these fancies affect not dogmas only, but simple notions also.

XLVI [Idols of the Tribe: the prejudice of preferring confirming instances]

The human understanding, when it has once adopted an opinion (either as being the received opinion or as being agreeable to itself), draws all things else to support and agree with it. And though there be a greater number and weight of instances to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by some distinction sets aside and rejects; in order that by this great and pernicious predetermination the authority of its former conclusions may remain inviolate. And therefore it was a good answer that was made by one when they showed him hanging in a temple a picture of those who had paid their vows as having escaped shipwreck, and would have him say whether he did not acknowledge the power of the gods,—"Aye," asked he again, "but where are they painted that were drowned after their vows?" And such is the way of all superstition, whether in astrology, dreams, omens, divine judgments, or the like; wherein men, having a delight in such vanities, mark the events where they are fulfilled, but where they fail, though this happen much oftener, neglect and pass them by. But with far more subtlety does this mischief insinuate itself into philosophy and the sciences; in which the first conclusion colours and brings
into conformity with itself all that come after, though far sounder and better. Besides, independently of that delight and vanity which I have described, it is the peculiar and perpetual error of the human intellect to be more moved and excited by affirmatives than by negatives; whereas it ought properly to hold itself indifferently disposed towards both alike. Indeed in the establishment of any true axiom, the negative instance is the more forcible of the two.

XLVIII [Idols of the Tribe: against “final causes”—the limits of teleology]

The human understanding is unquiet; it cannot stop or rest, and still presses onward, but in vain. Therefore it is that we cannot conceive of any end or limit to the world; but always as of necessity it occurs to us that there is something beyond. Neither again can it be conceived how eternity has flowed down to the present day; for that distinction which is commonly received of infinity in time past and in time to come can by no means hold; for it would thence follow that one infinity is greater than another, and that infinity is wasting away and tending to become finite. The like subtlety arises touching the infinite divisibility of lines, from the same inability of thought to stop. But this inability interferes more mischievously in the discovery of causes: for although the most general principles in nature ought to be held merely positive, as they are discovered, and cannot with truth be referred to a cause; nevertheless the human understanding, being unable to rest, still seeks something prior in the order of nature. And then it is that in struggling towards that which is further off it falls back upon that which is more nigh at hand; namely, on final causes [i.e., purposes]: which have relation clearly to the nature of man rather than to the nature of the universe; and from this source have strangely defiled philosophy. But he is no less an unskilled and shallow philosopher who seeks causes of that which is most general, than he who in things subordinate and subaltern omits to do so.

XLIX [Idols of the Tribe: against passion governing reason]

The human understanding is no dry light, but receives an infusion from the will and affections; whence proceed sciences which may be called "sciences as one would." For what a man had rather were true he more readily believes. Therefore he rejects difficult things from impatience of research; sober things, because they narrow hope; the deeper things of nature, from superstition; the light of experience, from arrogance and pride, lest his mind should seem to be occupied with things mean and transitory; things not commonly believed, out of deference to the opinion of the vulgar. Numberless in short are the ways, and sometimes imperceptible, in which the affections color and infect the understanding.

L [Idols of the Tribe: the philosophical limitations of sense perception]

But by far the greatest hindrance and aberration of the human understanding proceeds from the dullness, incompetency, and deceptions of the senses; in that things which strike the sense outweigh things which do not immediately strike it, though they be more important. Hence it is that speculation commonly ceases where sight ceases; insomuch that of things invisible there is little or no observation. Hence all the working of the spirits enclosed in tangible bodies lies hid and unobserved of men. So also all the more subtle changes of form in the parts of coarser substances (which
they commonly call alteration, though it is in truth local motion through exceedingly small spaces) is in like manner unobserved. And yet unless these two things just mentioned be searched out and brought to light, nothing great can be achieved in nature, as far as the production of works is concerned. So again the essential nature of our common air, and of all bodies less dense than air (which are very many), is almost unknown. For the sense by itself is a thing infirm and erring; neither can instruments for enlarging or sharpening the senses do much; but all the truer kind of interpretation of nature is effected by instances and experiments fit and apposite; wherein the sense decides touching the experiment only, and the experiment touching the point in nature and the thing itself. . . .

LIII  [Idols of the Cave: the variety of mental and physical types]

The Idols of the Cave take their rise in the peculiar constitution, mental or bodily, of each individual; and also in education, habit, and accident. Of this kind there is a great number and variety; but I will instance those the pointing out of which contains the most important caution, and which have most effect in disturbing the clearness of the understanding.

LIV  [Idols of the Cave: the distortions of partiality and habit]

Men become attached to certain particular sciences and speculations, either because they fancy themselves the authors and inventors thereof, or because they have bestowed the greatest pains upon them and become most habituated to them. But men of this kind, if they betake themselves to philosophy and contemplations of a general character, distort and colour them in obedience to their former fancies; a thing especially to be noticed in Aristotle, who made his natural philosophy a mere bond-servant to his logic, thereby rendering it contentious and well nigh useless. The race of chemists again out of a few experiments of the furnace have built up a fantastic philosophy, framed with reference to a few things. . . .

LV  [Idols of the Cave: two types of mind]

There is one principle and as it were radical distinction between different minds, in respect of philosophy and the sciences; which is this: that some minds are stronger and apter to mark the differences of things, others to mark their resemblances. The steady and acute mind can fix its contemplations and dwell and fasten on the subllest distinctions: the lofty and discursive mind recognises and puts together the finest and most general resemblances. Both kinds however easily err in excess, by catching the one at gradations, the other at shadows. . . .

LIX  [Idols of the Marketplace: the limitations of ordinary language]

But the Idols of the Marketplace are the most troublesome of all: idols which have crept into the understanding through the alliances of words and names. For men believe that their reason governs words; but it is also true that words react on the understanding; and this it is that has rendered philosophy and the sciences sophistical and inactive. Now words, being commonly framed and applied according to the capacity of the vulgar, follow those lines of division which are most obvious to the
vulgar understanding. And whenever an understanding of greater acuteness or a more
diligent observation would alter those lines to suit the true divisions of nature, words
stand in the way and resist the change. Whence it comes to pass that the high and
formal discussions of learned men end oftentimes in disputes about words and names;
with which (according to the use and wisdom of the mathematicians) it would be more
prudent to begin, and so by means of definitions reduce them to order. Yet even
definitions cannot cure this evil in dealing with natural and material things; since the
definitions themselves consist of words, and those words beget others: so that it is
necessary to recur to individual instances, and those in due series and order; as I shall
say presently when I come to the method and scheme for the formation of notions and
axioms.

LX  [Idols of the Marketplace: two kinds of verbal distortion]

The idols imposed by words on the understanding are of two kinds. They are either
names of things which do not exist (for as there are things left unnamed through lack
of observation, so likewise are there names which result from fantastic suppositions
and to which nothing in reality corresponds), or they are names of things which exist,
but yet confused and ill-defined, and hastily and irregularly derived from realities. Of
the former kind are Fortune, the Prime Mover, Planetary Orbits, Elements of Fire, and
like fictions which owe their origin to false and idle theories. And this class of idols is
more easily expelled, because to get rid of them it is only necessary that all theories
should be steadily rejected and dismissed as obsolete.

But the other class, which springs out of faulty and unskilful abstraction, is
intricate and deeply rooted. Let us take for example such a word as humid; and see
how far the several things which the word is used to signify agree with each other; and
we shall find the word humid to be nothing else than a mark loosely and confusedly
applied to denote a variety of actions which will not bear to be reduced to any constant
meaning.

LXI  [Idols of the Theatre: the place of method]

But the Idols of the Theatre are not innate, nor do they steal into the
understanding secretly, but are plainly impressed and received into the mind from the
play-books of philosophical systems and the perverted rules of demonstration.

But the course I propose for the discovery of sciences is such as leaves but little to
the acuteness and strength of wits, but places all wits and understandings nearly on a
level. For as in the drawing of a straight line or a perfect circle, much depends on the
steadiness and practice of the hand, if it be done by aim of hand only, but if with the aid
of rule or compass, little or nothing; so is it exactly with my plan.

LXII  [Idols of the Theater: the three types of false philosophy]

Idols of the Theatre, or of Systems, are many, and there can be and perhaps will be
yet many more.

In general however there is taken for the material of philosophy either a great deal
out of a few things, or a very little out of many things; so that on both sides philosophy
is based on too narrow a foundation of experiment and natural history, and decides on
the authority of too few cases. For the Rational School of philosophers snatches from
experience a variety of common instances, neither duly ascertained nor diligently examined and weighed, and leaves all the rest to meditation and agitation of wit.

There is also another class of philosophers, who having bestowed much diligent and careful labour on a few experiments, have thence made bold to educe and construct systems; wrestling all other facts in a strange fashion to conformity therewith.

And there is yet a third class, consisting of those who out of faith and veneration mix their philosophy with theology and traditions; among whom the vanity of some has gone so far aside as to seek the origin of sciences among spirits and genii. So that this parent stock of errors—this false philosophy—is of three kinds; the Sophistical, the Empirical, and the Superstitious.

LXIII  [Idols of the theater: against sophistical rationalism]

The most conspicuous example of the first class was Aristotle, who corrupted natural philosophy by his logic: fashioning the world out of categories; assigning to the human soul, the noblest of substances, a genus from words of the second intention; doing the business of density and rarity (which is to make bodies of greater or less dimensions, that is, occupy greater or less space), by the frigid distinction of act and power; asserting that single bodies have each a single and proper motion, and that if they participate in any other, then this results from an external cause; and imposing countless other arbitrary restrictions on the nature of things; being always more solicitous to provide an answer to the question and affirm something positive in words, than about the inner truth of things; a failing best shown when his philosophy is compared with other systems of note among the Greeks...

LXIV  [Idols of the Theater: against narrow empiricism]

But the Empirical school of philosophy gives birth to dogmas more deformed and monstrous than the Sophistical or Rational school. For it has its foundations not in the light of common notions, (which though it be a faint and superficial light, is yet in a manner universal, and has reference to many things,) but in the narrowness and darkness of a few experiments. To those therefore who are daily busied with these experiments, and have infected their imagination with them, such a philosophy seems probable and all but certain; to all men else incredible and vain. Of this there is a notable instance in the alchemists and their dogmas.... Nevertheless with regard to philosophies of this kind there is one caution not to be omitted; for I foresee that if ever men are roused by my admonitions to betake themselves seriously to experiment and bid farewell to sophistical doctrines, then indeed through the premature hurry of the understanding to leap or fly to universals and principles of things, great danger may be apprehended from philosophies of this kind; against which evil we ought even now to prepare.

LXV  [Idols of the Theater: against corrupting philosophy with superstition]

But the corruption of philosophy by superstition and an admixture of theology is far more widely spread, and does the greatest harm, whether to entire systems or their parts. For the human understanding is obnoxious to the influence of the imagination no less than to the influence of common notions. For the contentious and sophistical
kind of philosophy ensnares the understanding; but this kind, being fanciful and timid and half poetical, misleads it more by flattery. For there is in man an ambition of the understanding, no less than of the will, especially in high and lofty spirits . . . [II] This vanity some of the moderns have with extreme levity indulged so far as to attempt to found a system of natural philosophy on the first chapter of Genesis, on the book of Job, and other parts of the sacred writings; seeking for the dead among the living; which also makes the inhibition and repression of it the more important, because from this unwholesome mixture of things human and divine there arises not only a fantastic philosophy but also an heretical religion. Very meet it is therefore that we be soberminded, and give to faith that only which is faith's.

LXVI  [Idols of the Theater: against "species" and essentialism]

So much then for the mischievous authorities of systems, which are founded either on common notions, or on a few experiments, or on superstition. It remains to speak of the faulty subject-matter of contemplations especially in natural philosophy. Now the human understanding is infected by the sight of what takes place in the mechanical arts, in which the alternation of bodies proceeds chiefly by composition or separation and so imagines that something similar goes on in the universal nature of things. From this source has flowed the fiction of elements, and of their concourse for the formations of natural bodies. Again, when man contemplates nature working freely, he meets with different species of things, of animals, of plants, of minerals; whence he readily passes into the opinion that there are in nature certain primary forms which nature intends to educe, and that the remaining variety proceeds from hindrances and aberrations of nature in the fulfillment of her work, or from the collision of different species and the transplanting of one into another. To the first of these speculations we owe our primary qualities of the elements; to the other our occult properties and specific virtues; and both of them belong to those empty compendia of thought wherein the mind rests, and whereby it is diverted from more solid pursuits. . .

LXVII  [Idols of the Theater: against excessive dogmatism or skepticism]

A caution must also be given to the understanding against the intemperance which systems of philosophy manifest in giving or withholding assent; because intemperance of this kind seems to establish Idols and in some sort to perpetuate them, leaving no way open to reach and dislodge them.

This excess is of two kinds: the first being manifest in those who are ready in deciding, and render sciences dogmatic and magisterial; the other in those who deny that we can know anything, and so introduce a wandering kind of inquiry that leads to nothing; of which kinds the former subdues, the latter weakens the understanding. . . .

. . . [Y]et still when the human mind has once despaired of finding truth, its interest in all things grows fainter; and the result is that men turn aside to pleasant disputations and discourses and roam as it were from object to object, rather than keep on a course of severe inquisition. But, as I said at the beginning and am ever urging, the human senses and understanding, weak as they are, are not to be deprived of their authority, but to be supplied with helps.
LXVIII  [Conclusion: the scientific project]

So much concerning the several classes of Idols, and their equipage: all of which must be renounced and put away with a fixed and solemn determination, and the understanding thoroughly freed and cleansed; the entrance into the kingdom of man, founded on the sciences, being not much other than the entrance into the kingdom of heaven, whereinto none may enter except as a little child.