1. (20pts) A 10-member board holds an election for a chairperson. The candidates are Demoya, Ferguson, MacArthur and Hearn. Their preference rankings and approval votes are as follows:

| Number of voters: | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Demoya | $1 \sqrt{ }$ | $1 \sqrt{ }$ | 2 | 3 | $2 \sqrt{ }$ | $3 \sqrt{ }$ |
| Ferguson | $2 \sqrt{ }$ | 3 | $1 \sqrt{ }$ | 4 | $3 \sqrt{ }$ | 4 |
| MacArthur | $3 \sqrt{ }$ | $2 \sqrt{ }$ | 4 | $1 \sqrt{ }$ | $4 \sqrt{ }$ | $2 \sqrt{ }$ |
| Hearn | 4 | 4 | 3 | $2 \sqrt{ }$ | $1 \sqrt{ }$ | $1 \sqrt{ }$ |

a) Who wins the vote in a plurality election?
b) Who wins the vote in a plurality election, followed by a runoff of the first two finishers?
c) Who is the Condercet winner, if any?
d) Who is the winner using Borda's method? Perform the check on the sum of Borda points.
e) Who is the winner using the approval method?
f) In the Borda election, could the two voters who ranked MacArthur first achieve a preferable outcome by voting strategically, assuming all the other members voted as shown?

